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Abstract 
 
Foreign aid to Malawi has the ability to perpetuate the country’s fifteen-year long hunger 
crisis. For millions of Malawians, chronic starvation is attributable to their inability to access 
food available on internationalised markets. Bilateral foreign aid to the Southern African 
state is aimed at stimulating development which, if successful, should also lift the country 
beyond threat of chronic, long-term malnourishment for the poorest of its citizens. Donor’s, 
however, measure developmental aid’s success along a narrow set of indicators – such as 
economic growth – dictating the direction of policy for recipient nations wishing to maintain 
the inflow of aid. For Malawi, this is all but inevitable as foreign aid accounts for 40% of 
government revenue. As a result of this dependency on external income, Malawi’s 
government has targeted economic growth in order to maintain its aid support. Economic 
growth in Malawi has been fuelled by public spending and is unsustainable in the long term. 
The rapid growth was accompanied by high levels of inflation and the further entrenchment 
of a perennial trade accounts deficit, leaving the national currency weak. In addition, the 
majority of public spending reinforces the country’s economic identity of an agricultural 
state, ensuring that 90% of Malawians who rely on agriculture for an income will remain 
poor due to the imbalance of trade. The indirect perpetuation of an agricultural economy, 
alongside unsustainable and unstable growth, has led to a situation where most Malawians 
cannot afford to buy food. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
Stunted growth, increased susceptibility to bruising, rashes, the thinning of hair, a loss of 
bone density, joint inflammation, and a weakened immune system can all be caused by 
undernourishment – a phenomenon which, despite great advances in technological 
achievements over the centuries, remains one of the most pressing concerns facing millions. 
Additionally, undernourishment is also able to induce: anaemia, diarrhoea, disorientation, 
night blindness, mental deficiencies, enlargement of the thyroid gland, decreased reflex 
times, and amenorrhea (the disruption of reproductive regulation, particularly 
menstruation). Although mostly manifesting through physical ailments, undernourishment 
does have the ability to affect people negatively in many non-physical manners as well – 
such as psychologically, socially, and politically.  
Ultimately resulting in death if not addressed, it is wholly evident that 
undernourishment has severe consequences for anyone unable to meet their minimum 
nutritional needs, regardless of the duration and outcome of the episode of hunger. Of the 
nearly 900 million persons who are still faced with undernourishment on a daily basis, 98% 
of all starving peoples are located in third world nations. This suggests, at first glance, that 
the answer to staving off hunger lies with states’ ability to reach the level of development 
already enjoyed by the developed world. After all, if the vast majority of states enduring 
mass undernourishment are LDCs,1 then surely something endemic to all these states 
accounts for the presence of food insecurity.  
As such, the international community’s efforts at promoting development 
throughout the underdeveloped world are increasingly important in order to foster food 
security for millions of people located in at-risk communities. Foreign aid programs are the 
foremost tools used by wealthy and influential members of the international community in 
the hope of stoking development. If successful in promoting development, the prevailing 
                                                            
1 Less Developed Countries 
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logic dictates, food insecurity should also be addressed; the plight of millions of people, 
therefore, rests upon the assumption that efforts at development also promote food 
security. This paper, however, argues that efforts at promoting development may, contrary 
to expectations, hinder a state’s food security. 
1.1 Malawi 
Ethiopia, Biafra, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Somaliland are all regions with reputations of 
famines and food shortages. Being all African, their reputations have been tainted by their 
experience with food crises and has come to be the archetypical image representing the 
whole. Consider the perception of Africa by the world: for all the major tropes applied to the 
continent, hunger and poverty seem to be among the most common and consistent among 
its depictions by those unfamiliar with its realities. Major international crises, such as the 
food blockade on Biafra or the various droughts in the Horn of the continent (catapulted 
into the international public’s eye through initiatives such as Bob Geldoff’s Live Aid) have 
become symbolic of the plight of many Africans.  
Of course, this generalisation is exactly that: a generalisation. It is precisely this 
misinformed depiction of Africa, including other negative stereotypes such as corruption 
and civil war, which Africans are attempting to address. For Malawi, however, the trope of a 
starving African child is an all too true representation of the country’s reality. Malawi’s past, 
present, and foreseeable future was, is, and will be characterised by mass hunger. A 
relatively small, landlocked country in Southern Africa with an equally small population, 
Malawi’s plight was always doomed to be relegated to the margins of the world’s collective 
psyche. 
Since independence in 1964, Malawi has faced numerous episodes of widespread 
hunger. However, instead of abating in frequency as expected, Malawi’s hunger problem 
has evolved into a protracted saga characterised by long-term undernourishment among a 
large percentage of the country’s population. In the past, the country’s hunger concerns 
were attributed to droughts, floods, and other similar disruptions in the country’s ability to 
supply its citizens with food. By 2002, the country faced yet another bout of flooding, 
destroying much of the annual agricultural output. The following 13 years would see hunger 
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and malnourishment linger throughout the country. Similar disasters to the flooding of 2002 
have been experienced in the ensuing 13 years, the most recent (as of at the time of 
writing) occurring in January of 2015. 
At this point, it seems as if the country’s food problems can be attributed to natural 
disasters – to exogenous events – making the state incredibly unfortunate, but hardly the 
victim of malignant foreign intervention as this paper will claim. In fact, the prevailing 
language used by media in descriptions of Malawi’s food crises underlines this belief, with 
the various crises being repeatedly labelled as famines – carrying connotations of being 
caused by external, uncontrollable, and unforeseen forces.  
Critically, this paper will base its argument upon the notion that food insecurity in 
Malawi is misattributed to a lack in supply of food. If Malawi’s current food crisis has been 
caused by a lack in the amount of food available, then issues affecting the country’s supply 
of food – such as flooding – would be pertinent. It will be argued that the food crisis Malawi 
is currently weathering, however, is caused by the inability to access food, not the 
unavailability thereof. As such, in order to argue that foreign aid is indeed a contributing 
factor in Malawi’s on-going food problems, it will be necessary to demonstrate the effect 
had by aid on Malawi’s ability to access food.  
1.2 Outline and Proposed Argument 
This thesis will argue that: 
The presence of foreign aid in Malawi is detrimental to the country’s attempts to 
become food secure as it constrains the nation’s ability to access food. 
Chapter Two will introduce the various terms which underwrite the argument and which will 
be used throughout the remainder of the paper. Firstly, foreign aid will be explored, 
explaining what it does and how it will be viewed in context of the argument at hand. Three 
theoretical stances on foreign aid will be presented from: the Realist, Liberal, and Marxist 
schools of International Relations. Secondly, a discussion on the issue of food security will 
follow in order to not only define it, but to highlight key details in its understanding – 
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namely the four components of food security and the four levels of society which are 
affected by issues of food security. Thirdly, the chapter will present the overarching 
framework of International Political Economy as suitable for arguing foreign aid’s negative 
effects on food security. Branches of the Marxist school of thought, Structuralism and World 
Systems Theory, will be used due to the structural nature of its interpretation of world 
affairs. 
Understood via the overarching structuralist framework advocated by a Marxist 
interpretation of the world, Chapter Three introduces the various building blocks 
constituting the particular structure within which Malawi exists and is subjected to. The 
various elements comprising the structure can also be regarded as contextual aspects. 
Starting with global post-World War II trends in international food security, the evolution of 
food crises is presented in order to highlight both the reality of food security on the 
international stage, as well as how the world addresses the problem. The two food regimes 
(the dogmas dictating policy making on food security) will be introduced via a Marxist 
understanding – that is to say, as a core and peripheral set of norms dictated by the 
historical trends in global food crises. Recent global food crises will then be put into 
perspective via these trends and food regimes before introducing the case at hand. Malawi’s 
own food crises will be discussed, with particular emphasis placed upon the years ranging 
from 2000 to 2015, before disclosing various aspects of Malawian society, economy, and 
political context which is pertinent to the argument. 
Finally, drawing on the terminology introduced in Chapter Two and the outline of the 
prevailing context provided in Chapter Three, Chapter Four shall focus upon the pertinent elements 
present in Malawi’s case and in line with the argument. With this focus, the argument of foreign 
aid will be critiqued along the right-left political continuum. Foreign aid’s effect on food 
security will follow, placing emphasis on the potential effect foreign aid plays on access to 
food, before applying this critique specifically to Malawi. Foreign aid, it will be argued, has 
the following negative effects upon Malawi: promoting government apathy, enabling 
corruption, enforcing the adoption of unsuitable and short-sighted policies by donors, and 
numerous negative economic knock-ons (on the balance of trade, inflation, currency 
volatility, and so forth). These different effects are not only dependent on foreign aid’s 
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ability to induce apathy among government, but to keep Malawi’s national government 
dependent on the aid it receives.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Theoretical Framework 
 
The following chapter will introduce the three main components that comprise the 
theoretical framework which will underwrite the argument that foreign aid is promoting and 
perpetuating food insecurity in Malawi. These three components are: foreign aid, food 
security, and the Marxist perspectives of Structuralism and World Systems Theory. These 
three components will be introduced in isolation before being synthesised into a working 
blueprint for the remaining two chapters.  
 
2.1 Foreign Aid 
2.1.1 The Properties of Foreign Aid 
Usually, as pointed out by Tomohisa Hattori,2 conceptions of foreign aid are largely 
ideologically inclined - more geared towards describing foreign aid through what it is used 
for, rather than conceptualising the term in the abstract. In other words, the literature on 
foreign aid focuses on the question “what does foreign aid do?” instead of asking “what are 
[the] properties of foreign aid?”3 Writing in 2001, Hattori aims to refine and present a more 
apropos definition of the concept of foreign aid, but ultimately frames his definition upon 
facets of social constructivism, thereby failing (ironically) to be ideologically-neutral in itself.  
Despite this, his inquiry remains pertinent to the conceptualisation of foreign aid. In 
searching for an operationalised definition, Hattori notices that when popular 
conceptualisations of the term “foreign aid” attempt to answer the question “what does aid 
do?”, the answers given are based upon a preconceived notion of what aid is at its most 
                                                            
2 Hattori, 2001 
3 Hattori, 2001: 634 
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fundamental level. Without some kind of working conception of what aid is, the question of 
what it does cannot be answered. Therefore, Hattori – working from the assumption that 
social reality is layered – uses this aspect of foreign aid within the literature to infer from the 
common assumptions of the popularly held definitions, via retroductive reasoning, 
theorising that: 
“foreign aid consists of material goods or services that are owned or controlled 
by donors, the allocation of which may vary according to their purposes and 
interests.”4  
This is a similar position given by many more overtly ideological scholars of foreign aid, such 
as Hans Morgenthau (who had written in the Realist tradition). Foreign aid, Morgenthau 
states, comes in many forms but has a common core: “the transfer of money, goods [or] 
services from one nation to another.”5 The Liberal Internationalist scholars Hollis B. Chenery 
and Allan M. Strout state, in a similar vein, that foreign aid refers to the “transfer of 
resources” such as “skills and organisational ability[,] domestic savings[,] commodities and 
services.”6 In all these definitions, the idea of a transfer of resources remains critical. 
The language surrounding aid also merits a brief examination. The “aid” referred to 
in the concept foreign aid, for example, conjures associations with the idea of giving and 
resource allocation. According to economic anthropologists Marshall Sahlins7 and Marcel 
Maus,8 there exist “three types of resource allocation in human society: economic 
exchange, redistribution, and giving.”9 Despite this, foreign aid has largely become 
“commonly perceived as” being exclusively one of these types of exchange – “a gift 
extended from one country to another.”10 Emma Mawdsley, taking gift theory as a 
springboard for a discussion on aid as a gift, states that “there is an ambivalence in the 
performance of the gift – it must be conducted as voluntary, disinterested and ‘free’” while 
simultaneously carrying across the undertones that an obligation exists for future 
                                                            
4 Hattori, 2001: 635 
5 Morgenthau, 1962: 301 
6 Chenery & Strout, 1966: 681 
7 Sahlins, 1972 
8 Maus, 1967 
9 Sahlins, 1972: 185-230 in Hattori, 2001 
10 Hattori, 2001: 636 
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reciprocation.”11 This differs from the perception that aid garners neither certainty of return 
nor political entitlement. This aspect of foreign aid, however, is a contested notion among 
the different ideological schools of thought (as will be discussed later). 
Other terms, such as “donor”, should not be solely equated to the act of giving (as 
referred to above) as it oversimplifies the complexity behind the ideological nature of 
foreign aid as a concept. Although the common understanding of the term “donor” implies 
the giving of a gift, used in the context of foreign aid the term “donor” is merely used to 
indicate the actor transferring the resources in question. No judgement concerning altruistic 
intentions should, in theory, be considered. Theory and ideology do, however, play a role in 
the conceptualisation of foreign aid and needs to be taken into consideration. 
2.1.2 What Aid Does - Theoretical Contention 
Foreign aid, like many concepts within the field of International Relations, is not immune to 
the push-and-pull exerted by the many theoretical and ideological schemas underwriting 
the discipline. Consequently, operationalizing a working definition of the concept can prove 
to be more difficult than a first glance may offer. Writing in 2001, Hattori attempts to 
navigate this politicised landscape and seeks to answer the question “[w]hat is foreign 
aid?”12 He suggests that the term has commonly manifested among three ideological lines 
found within IR – Realism, International Liberalism, and the traditionally Marxist World 
Systems Theory.  
In essence, Realists regard foreign aid as a tool of Foreign Policy. Writing in 1962, 
Hans Morgenthau (considered by Hattori as being the most prominent amongst realist 
scholars writing on the issue) noted that foreign aid, as a concept, does prove to be 
controversial through the assumption – which he promotes – “that [foreign aid] is an 
instrument of conducting foreign policy”13 (emphasis added). Furthermore, Morgenthau 
makes the argument that all foreign aid is explicitly political and therefore provides 
additional weight to the argument of foreign aid as a tool in the accomplishment of foreign 
                                                            
11 Mawdsley,  2011: 258 
12 Hattori, 2001: 633 
13 Morgenthau, 1962: 301 
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policy goals. The popular idea that foreign aid is an act of giving, therefore, does not fit the 
Realist worldview as foreign aid suffers “neither certainty of return nor political 
entitlement”14 associated with the act of giving. Even cases of humanitarian foreign aid, 
such as emergency supplies sent to a state after a natural disaster, could be considered as 
being implicitly political (as opposed to explicitly carrying intent of political gains) – that is to 
say, that some return or political entitlement is to be accrued from the resources 
provided.15  
Liberal internationalists lean more towards the functionalist aspects of foreign aid, 
yet still maintain a largely ideological perspective of the concept – attempting to promote a 
more humanistic approach to foreign aid. Proponents of this school of thought maintain 
that foreign aid’s raison d’être is the purportedly neutral reason “to contribute to efforts to 
overcome worldwide poverty, underdevelopment, and distress.”16 Prominent idealist David 
H. Lumsdaine, for example, counters the popular realist perceptions of aid by society in his 
systematic study of foreign aid programs in the years 1949-1989. His study concludes that 
“donors have been less motivated by political and economic interests than by humanitarian 
ones.”17 This view is in stark contrast to the view held by Realists such as Morgenthau. It 
does, however, fall in line with the idea that foreign aid is an act of giving – and therefore 
carries the implicit characteristics of being “voluntary, disinterested and ‘free’.”18 This is 
further evidence that foreign aid, as a concept, is difficult to remove from its ideological 
undertones as even the minority of supposedly a-political definitions could easily be 
characterised as humanistic by other advocates of liberalism. 
Finally, the World System Theorists stay true to the Marxist undertones of the 
theory, proposing that foreign aid assists in the perpetuation of a world divided into a core 
and a periphery, “promoting the unequal accumulation of capital in the world.”19 The stance 
lends itself to ideas promulgated by neo-Gramscian IR scholars. For example, it is argued 
that foreign aid programs have been linked with a particular “development trajectory” 
                                                            
14 Hattori, 2001: 636 
15 Morgenthau, 1962: 301 
16 Nowak-Lehmann, Martinez-Zarzoso, Klasen, & Herzer, 2009: 1184 
17 Pierre, 1993: 195 
18 Mawdsley,  2011: 258 
19 Hattori, 2001: 633 
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which is “aimed at the creation and buttressing of multilateral capitalism” which favours 
donor nations.20 Again, this differs from the supposedly politically neutral conceptualisation 
that foreign aid is characterised by an absence in expected returns or political entitlement 
espoused by the term “giving”. 
2.1.3 Foreign Aid as to be used in this Paper 
For the ends of this paper, foreign aid will be treated along the same lines delineated by 
Hattori above. Thus, foreign aid is to be understood as something which encompasses all 
types of resources – physical goods, skills and technical know-how, financial grants, gifts, or 
loans – as transferred by donors to recipients. Acknowledging that foreign aid, as a concept, 
carries ideological undertones due to the very language it employs, the term transfer will be 
used in place of the term giving.  
As mentioned above, conceptualising foreign aid is difficult to do in the absence of 
ideology. This dissertation proposes Marxist and Realist conceptualisations of foreign aid in 
its attempt to answer the question “What are the possible consequences of Foreign Aid 
inflows in impacting the hunger crisis in Malawi?”. The main reason for the choice of Marxist 
and Realist interpretations of foreign aid can be contributed to the acceptance by both 
schools of the political nature of foreign aid. This differs from the functionalist (and 
supposed a-political) overtures presented by Liberal Internationalists in their esteem of 
foreign aid as an act of giving, espousing an absence of political entitlement or certainty of 
reciprocation. 
The decision to use Marxist and Realist conceptualisations also comes in light of the 
work done by Alberto Alesina and David Dollar on the issue of foreign aid’s purpose. Alesina 
and Dollar21 concur with the sentiment expressed by Morgenthau. In their study “Who 
Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?”, Alesina and Dollar ask whether the giving patterns 
of aid donors reflect the recipient states’ economic and political realities – or whether a 
recipient’s receipt of assistance is mirrored by indications of the society being likely to utilise 
the aid in an effective manner, such as improving growth or reducing the levels of poverty. 
                                                            
20 Hawley, 1987: 748 
21 Alesina & Dollar, 2000 
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Their findings suggest that donors are “dictated as much by political and strategic 
considerations, as by the economic needs and policy performance” of the recipient states.22 
These political indications are things such as colonial links, alliances, strategic interests, and 
so forth. Interestingly, their study directly contradicts Lumsdaine’s study finding that aid is 
allocated due to humanitarian interests, as mentioned above. 
Furthermore, Alesina and Dollar highlight that “given considerable evidence” the 
endowment of foreign aid is sensitive to political variables, whereas economic incentives 
and “good policies” promotes the flow of FDI instead.23 In effect, this strengthens the 
critique of foreign aid as being possibly wasteful and counterproductive in as much as the 
primary concern of giving aid lies not with the titular task of aiding a state or society, but as 
a self-serving tool in achieving specific goals. This is not to say that foreign aid cannot 
produce positive outcomes, but rather that these positive outcomes are largely secondary 
goals to political interests. 
2.2 Food Security  
 2.2.1 Food Security 
Food Security falls under the “human security” framework,24 and can be broadly described 
as “freedom from fear [and] freedom from want for all people,” protecting and empowering 
the world’s most vulnerable people.25 The seven main categories found under human 
security, according to the UNDP, are: economic security, food security, health security, 
environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.26 
Human security encompasses two broad aspects – protection from chronic threats, and 
protection from sudden threats. Food security falls into both these categories. 
                                                            
22 Alesina & Dollar, 2000: 33 
23 Alesina & Dollar, 2000 
24 Sen, 1981; McDonald, 2010: 17 
25 Ogata & Cels, 2003: 273; McDonald, 2010: 24-25 
26 McDonald, 2010: 25; King & Murray, 2002:589 
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At the most basic level, food security is defined as: “the availability of food and people’s 
ability to access it.”27 Chisholm and Tyers, writing in 1982, state that food security concerns 
obtaining “an adequate supply of food for all people at all times.”28 
Prior to the rise of the term food security, nations and scholars embraced the 
discourse surrounding the concept of “food policy”; Amartya Sen and Shlomo Reutlinger’s 
work concerning human security, and particularly starvation, led to the evolution of “food 
policy” into “food security.”29 Internationally, attitudes surrounding the causes of food 
security (as a concept) can be gauged from the various World Food Summits. The first 
summit, held in 1974 (and as a response to the world food crisis of 1972-1974), was centred 
upon the idea of food insecurity as a result of inadequate supply (both at the national and 
the global level).30 The definition used by Roumasset (which he claims to be widely accepted 
at the time) is “the ability to meet target consumption levels in the face of fluctuating 
production, prices, and incomes.”31 Two decades worth of debate would see the World 
Food Summit of 1996 change tact, moving away from supply related causes of food 
insecurity to issues concerning “the inability of people to gain access to food due to 
poverty”, noting issues of access.32 This new reconceptualisation was critical, given that at 
the time “over 32 possible definitions of food security” existed.33 In 2001, the World Food 
Summit further agreed upon the importance of “social access” to food.34 
Through this debate among its members, a more nuanced definition has been agreed 
upon by the FAO - the agreed upon definition of food security, in addition to issues of 
availability, also encompasses physical, economic and social access and is the standard 
definition used today, the definition used by various scholars.35 
                                                            
27 McDonald, 2010: 15 
28 Chisholm & Tyers, 1982: 5 
29 Maxwell & Slater, 2003: 531 
30 Smith, el Obeid, and Jensen, 2000:200 
31 Roumasset, 1982: 129 
32 Smith, el Obeid, and Jensen, 2000:200; McDonald, 2010: 16-18 
33 Runge, Senauer, Pardey, and Rosegrant, 2003: 5 
34 McDonald, 2010: 15 
35 Rayfuse and Weisfelt, 2012: 3 
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“Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary 
needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”36 
2.2.2 Access and Availability 
As mentioned, the broadened definition is built upon issues of access, availability, and 
reliability. If any of these three elements are lacking, food insecurity can be said to be 
present.37 The World Health Organisation (WHO) agrees that food security must address 
“people's dietary needs as well as their food preferences,”38 but argue that in addition to 
access, availability and reliability, state that food use (or utilisation) be considered as a 
fourth element of food security – where food use delineates “appropriate use based on 
knowledge of basic nutrition and care” and “sufficient nutrients for a productive and healthy 
life.”39 Therefore, food security rests upon issues of availability, access, reliability, and food 
use.40  
Food security is implicated at four overlapping, and nested, levels: global, national, 
household, and individual.41 The first two levels concern the availability of food, whereas 
the last two concerns both availability and access. Food use and reliability are inherent at all 
levels. While the global level encompasses total world food production, the national level is 
determined by factors such as domestic production, availability of food stocks, net imports 
of food, and food aid.42 Handy Williamson notes that during the early stages of its 
politicisation (coinciding with the Rome conference on Food in 1974), many writers 
identified food security as only a concern at the national and global levels of food 
availability.43 An indication of this is an early definition of food security being delineated as 
“the ability of countries to meet target consumption levels.”44 
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At the level of the household, availability is determined by the preceding levels 
(referring back to the nested nature of the framework) – unavailability of food at either the 
global or national levels has the chance of producing or exacerbating an instance of food 
insecurity at the level of the household.45 In addition to the effect on food availability by 
processes at the global and national levels, accessibility to food “is determined by a 
household's ‘full’ income.”46 This links with Amartya Sen’s notion of food security and 
biological measures of poverty, stating that “starvation is the most telling aspect of 
poverty,”47 thereby linking income and the issue of food security. Although the issue of 
poverty was finally adopted in 1996 at the second World Food Summit, its link to the 
concept had been recognised almost immediately following the publication of Sen’s work; 
for example, Chisholm and Tyers state that the elimination of poverty would be of 
paramount importance in any restructuring of the global economy aimed at fighting food 
insecurity.48  Even the World Bank’s definition of food security (1986) makes reference to 
nutrition, stating that the concept concerned “access by all people at all times to enough 
food for an active, healthy life.”49 
Full income denotes both financial and physical income – both money and goods 
earned; this allows for the inclusion of food security maintained in other ways, such as via 
bartering or in cases of subsistence production. This is important to note (methodologically) 
as households might be low earners, but might be food secure through other means (this 
includes private donations, such as aid and charity). Furthermore, it is important to note 
that a household’s ability to provide food for itself is in competition with other basic needs 
of the household – such as medical care, education, and so forth. A situation where a 
household’s access to food is in conflict with access to other basic needs, is not considered a 
food secure household.50 
Lastly, at the level of the individual, the nutritional aspect of food becomes 
important. Without nutritional security, the goal of food security is not achieved; “without 
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an assurance of nutritional adequacy food security has very little meaning.”51 Nutritional 
security is achieved when the food consumed is “utilized such that adequate performance is 
maintained in growth, resisting or recovering from disease, pregnancy, lactation, and 
physical work.”52 A further two determinants of nutritional security are non-food related – 
these are “health” and “care”. Nutritional security at the level of the individual implies 
issues of access. 
Craig Pearson states that the existence of food insecurity is simply explained: “food 
production and its distribution do not meet the needs of the world’s population.”53 
Pearson’s focus on production and distribution corresponds to the ideas of availability and 
access (respectively). Although food insecurity at the different levels can be driven by many 
causes – such as war, climate change, population growth, political instability, inequality, and 
so forth – approaching the issue of food insecurity from these four different levels highlights 
two basic components of insecurity: “insufficient national food availability and insufficient 
access to food by households and individuals.”54 Insufficient food availability at the national 
level falls under the domain of “food sovereignty”. The term food security encompasses 
ideas of “food sovereignty”.  
2.2.3 Starvation and Famine 
Food insecurity has historically been associated with “local famines, caused by crop failures, 
plagues, war or an increase in population.”55 The problem with this association, however, is 
that it carries the inherent claim that food insecurity is only caused by external shocks to the 
system; occurrences which can only be partly prevented or mitigated by planning and 
policy. Sen discusses this misconception, stating that although the presence of famines 
implies starvation, the presence of starvation does not in turn necessarily imply the 
presence of a famine. Furthermore, and in connection with the biological measurements of 
poverty, Sen states that starvation indicates the presence of poverty, but that poverty does 
not ensure the presence of starvation. He explains this link between starvation and poverty 
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by stating that “the absolute dispossession that characterises starvation is more than 
sufficient to be diagnosed as poverty” regardless of relative measures.56 
There also exists a difference in categorisation between famines and what Sen labels 
“a starvation”. Famines are characterised as a sudden collapse of the level of food 
consumption and the sudden outbreak of acute starvation. However, “a starvation” is 
associated with a lowness or declining level of food consumption, as well as the “existence 
[or worsening trends] of much regular starvation.”57 Furthermore, famines are 
differentiated in the people it affects in comparison to “a starvation” – although famines can 
be widespread, “there is no reason to think that it will affect all groups in a famine-affected 
nation.”58 Famines, he claims, are primarily a rural phenomenon,59 whereas “a starvation” 
affects both urban and rural based populations.  
The issue of long-term and short-term food security is partly associated with this 
categorisation (also referred to above as chronic and sudden threats). For example, chronic 
food insecurity (“a starvation” in Sen’s words) is “a problem [tackled by] decreasing 
poverty.”60 The expansion of food security, as a concept, has also allowed for the expansion 
of the time variable inherent in food security, and human security as a whole – policy 
makers must address both the possibilities of danger emanating from the sudden or 
unexpected (such as the famines discussed by Sen) as well as threats which are pervasive 
(more characteristic of “starvation”).61 In essence, famine is largely differentiated from “a 
starvation” due to its underlying cause; famine denotes a lack in availability of food, 
whereas “a starvation” denotes a lack in accessibility to food. 
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2.3 IPE and Ideology 
2.3.1 International Political Economy (IPE) 
It is important to take note that the problem addressed in this paper is not an issue to be 
solely dealt with through economic inquiry; foreign aid emanating from an external actor 
demonstrates the political nature of the question, since choices to give aid are effectively 
enabling donors to decide “who gets what, when, and how,” (to quote Harold Laswell). 
However, because the issue does connote aspects of developmental economics, a hybrid 
approach to the problem must be taken.62 Thus, elements, ideologies, and theoretical 
understandings from the sub discipline of IPE will be employed. 
In essence, IPE is concerned with the “mutual influences of the market and sources 
of authority, including the state”63 – that is to say, “the interplay of economics and 
politics”64 at the international level. The assumption behind IPE is that aspects of “[t]he 
international, the political, and the economic”65 do not operate and interact in a void. Other 
than the interplay of economics and politics, social and cultural aspects must be taken into 
consideration as well.  
The elements of IPE that will be used in attempting to answer the problem 
statement are: the ideas of relational and structural power, the three differing levels of 
analysis (already touched upon in discussions of food security above), and the idea of power 
structures.  
While relational power largely exists in its most “potent form at the level of the 
state” 66 and involves inter-actor dynamics, structural power concerns the ability “to shape 
and determine the structures of the global political economy.”67 This is important, since 
markets, states, and individuals are (according to Susan Strange)68 connected to one 
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another by varying power structures – such as the international structures of “security, 
production, finance, and knowledge.”69 Lastly, IPE offers three distinctive perspectives, 
based on different values and beliefs, through which to explain events concerning political 
economy; these perspectives are Mercantilism, Liberalism, and Structuralism70 (Marxism). 
These perspectives mirror the IR traditions of Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism. Discussions 
above on the differing ideological interpretations of “what foreign aid does” highlight this. 
For the purpose of attempting an answer to the problem statement presented, a Marxist 
perspective will be taken. 
2.3.2 Marxism 
Discussion around Karl Marx’s writings, as well as any Marxist offshoot thereof, can 
realistically be the subject of many books, let alone academic essays, and thus remains 
firmly beyond the scope of this dissertation; therefore, the following examination will be 
restricted to elements relevant to its application to IPE and the problem statement at hand. 
Marxism is a form of Socialism, based in the promotion of a stance against Capitalism 
“in the attempt to provide a more humane and socially worthwhile alternative.”71 Marxist 
theory espouses a materialist conception of history; that is to say, that past and future 
“processes of historical change are ultimately a reflection of the economic development of a 
society.”72 In a Marxist’s esteem, it is economic developments which are the catalyst behind 
changes throughout history. The central dynamic of these aforementioned economic 
developments is the tension present between the means of production and the relations of 
production – or dialectical materialism – that “form the economic base of society.”73 The 
systems of production found in each society “creates ruling and ruled classes”74 divided 
among economic lines. The upper classes, according to Marxist thinking, are concerned with 
extracting wealth from society, often at the expense of “lower” classes, creating a 
“fundamental imbalance of power.”75 The bourgeois class (the owners of the means of 
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production) exploit their proletariat counterparts (those who sell their labour) as the 
bourgeoisie attempt to extract wealth by maximising profits.  
This exploitation of the masses leads to alienation: alienation of the proletariat 
“from the product of their labour” as they produce commodities to be sold for profit and 
not for subsistence; alienation from the process of work itself, as they are “forced to work 
under the supervision of… managers”; alienation from their fellow working class peers since 
the “work is not social [and workers] are encouraged to be self-interested;”76 and alienation 
from their own humanity as the mounting dehumanisation of the economic structure 
reduces the working classes to a commodity, void of creativity and fulfilment. The end result 
is “a mass of proletarian misery,”77 inevitably fuelling a Socialist revolution.  
Strands of Modern Marxism, in particular, have sparked a keen interest in the 
humanistic aspect of Marx’s philosophy, highlighting the continued dehumanising effect 
modern capitalism has on workers. Furthermore, scholars falling under the label of Modern 
Marxism, such as Antonio Gramsci, have been able to disassociate from the “rigid 
base/superstructure straightjacket”78 of dialectic materialism. Gramsci, for example was a 
forerunner of the idea popularised by Susan Strange; the idea that an actor (the 
bourgeoisie) are able to shape the rules of the system in their favour through maintaining 
hegemony in the knowledge structure of society. This hegemony is enforced through: 
“the spiritual and cultural supremacy of the ruling class, brought through the 
spread of bourgeois values and beliefs via civil society – the media, churches, 
youth movements, trade unions and so on.”79 
2.3.3 Structuralism 
Marxist theories of international relations can also be referred to as Structuralist or 
Economic Structuralist theories. This relates to Marx’s belief in a material conception of 
history (mentioned above) whereby “it is the [economic] structure that dominates events, 
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more so than ideas, nature, or military generals.”80 The Structuralist aspect of Marxism is 
also partly down to the core belief by Marxists that “the social world should be analyzed as 
a totality;”81 as a whole and not the sum of its parts. In this manner, it partly shares the view 
of IPE as a discipline that dividing the social world into distinct spheres of inspection and 
analysis is unhelpful and counterproductive. Furthermore, this Structuralist perspective 
regards the international political economy “in terms of class exploitation driven by market 
forces.”82 It dictates the dissemination of wealth and power, often in a self-perpetuating 
manner, creating a virtuous cycle where power begets wealth which in turn begets power.  
The role of the state, in the esteem of Structuralism, is not as an independent force 
(as espoused by Realist and Mercantilist traditions) or as a constraint to the free flow of 
economic activity (as advocated by International Liberalism), but instead as an inherently 
capitalist machine… no matter what its form.”83 The existence of the state runs concurrent 
to the interest of the ruling class, being virtually “intertwined”. 
Additionally, the institutions identified as part of the international capitalist 
weltanschauung are deemed to be “inherently biased in favor (sic) of the dominant powers” 
as they are “primarily responsible for reorganizing (sic) and reproducing… institutions of 
class, property, currency, contract, and markets.”84 Since the focus is not on states, but on 
class divisions, Marxists such as Vladimir Lenin proposed the idea that “exploitation is 
transmitted internationally” as enabled by the dominant international structures present – 
such as the knowledge and security structures. Critically:  
“[s]tructuralists argue that security structures linking rich countries with poorer 
ones are another aspect of imperialism.”85 
This is not limited to the security structures of the global political economy either; 
structuralists argue that the same dynamic is enabled via the knowledge structure. One 
hypothetical scenario of such subjugation via the knowledge structure is the example of 
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limiting the dissemination of productivity-enhancing technologies to poorer countries (for 
example, through international patent and information laws) to maintain an economic 
advantage in terms of production among richer states. 
Ultimately, exploitation is systematic – present in “each of the four IPE structures: 
production, finance, security, and knowledge.”86 Without having the structural power 
(largely produced through wealth), an actor is doomed to the status quo. 
2.3.4 World Systems Theory 
World Systems Theory (WST) developed in response to the advancement of critique and 
thought of the nature of the capitalist system in the aftermath of Karl Marx’s writing. The 
world had seen not the collapse of the Capitalist system and a subsequent revolution of the 
proletariat (as predicted by Marx), but had instead seen the emergence of what many 
Marxist scholars (such as Lenin) labelled “monopoly capitalism”. This monopoly capitalism 
saw to the intensification of class stratification. As a result, a “socially structured and socially 
reproduced… power hierarchy” was born.87 This hierarchy traditionally consisted of two 
tiers. These tiers would come to be known as the more developed core and the less 
developed periphery, denoting the global parallel to the bourgeois and proletariat classes 
(respectively). This advancement, it was theorised, brought about internal divisions in the 
global proletariat class as wealth extracted by the core from the periphery could be used “to 
improve the lot of their own working class.”88 
These ideas were advanced by the South American leftist tradition, particularly by 
the Argentinian economic scholar Raul Prebisch, building on the work of the German Hans 
Singer. Their subsequent collaborative hypothesis, known as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, 
proposes that the divide between the haves and the have-nots will only be exasperated due 
to a “declining terms of trade” where the price of manufactured goods “increases more 
rapidly than that of raw materials.”89 These ideas were supported and promoted by scholars 
such as André Gunder Frank and the then to be Brazilian president, Henrique Fernando 
                                                            
86 Balaam & Veseth, 2001: 78-79 
87 Chase-Dunne & Grimes, 1995: 389 
88 Hobden & Jones, 2008: 147 
89 Prebisch & Singer, in Hobden & Jones, 2008: 147 
Page | 30  
 
Cardoso.90 Of all the scholars of World Systems Theory, however, it is the work of the 
American sociologist, Immanuel Wallerstein, which garnered the most attention. 
Dubbed as “Modern World Systems Theory”, Wallerstein’s work (along with the 
work by other scholars, such as Christopher Chase-Dunne) maintain the general Marxist 
attitude that capitalist forces within the world system determine and shape “the political 
and social relations… within and between nations and other international entities.”91 These 
capitalist forces are continually creating and re-creating the institutions of the modern 
world – institutions found within the domains of the structures of the global political 
economy.92 
In addition to the core and the periphery of the traditional Structuralist perspective 
of IPE, WST includes the addition of a third class – the semi-periphery. This semi-periphery, 
“although dominated by core economic interests… has its own relatively vibrant 
indigenously owned industrial base.”93 It acts as a buffer between the core and the 
periphery, soaking up superfluous industries from the core not deemed to be profitable 
anymore (such as textile and manufacturing industries). It also provides a surplus of labour 
for industries located in the core in order to counteract any market forces which might 
potentially push labour costs up. Other than acting as an economic “stabiliser”, the semi-
periphery also acts as a political “stabiliser” as well.94  
Furthermore, the core, semi-periphery, and periphery tend to be geographically 
distinguishable – largely due to historical exploitations such as the forces unleashed by 
imperialism. These geographic zones are loosely referred to as the “global north” and the 
“global south” (the core and the periphery, respectively). Crucially, although the state does 
play a role in WST, it is not the only actor under consideration since the main concern 
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remains “class relations and patterns of exploitation.”95 Capitalists from the core merely 
make use of the authority conferred by the state as a means to maximise individual profit.96 
The interlinked aspect of these three zones perpetuates the exploitive relationship 
sustaining the core; in this tripartite relationship, wealth continues to be “drained away 
from the [global] periphery to the core.”97 Consequently, as wealth drains from the 
periphery, the rich only become more powerful in their ability to influence the political 
economy in their favour. As a result, positions become entrenched, thus ensuring that the 
core remains rich at the expense of a periphery that is compelled to remain poor by design. 
The virtuous cycle of the “global north” comes at a cost: perpetuating prosperity and power 
in the core conversely perpetuates the on-going vicious cycle in the “global south”. 
2.4 Combining the Theory 
This paper aims to present an argument based on the idea that foreign aid is negatively 
impacting the human security of Malawians. Human security is a multi-faceted concept, 
encompassing a myriad of issues – from economic security to environmental security. 
However, for the ends of this paper, foreign aid’s impact will be centred upon one of these 
issues contributing to the human security framework: the notion of food security. 
Food security loosely mirrors most IR work in its presentation of the world via 
different levels (as in the traditional third, second, and first levels of IR theory). However, in 
addition to the global, national and individual levels, the concept of food security 
incorporates a fourth level between the level of the state and the individual – the 
household. These levels are nested; each level is contained by its predecessor. The topmost 
layer is the global, followed by the national level, the household level, and the bottommost 
level, the level of the Individual. 
Food security implicates issues of availability, access, food use, and reliability (see 
appendix, figure 2.1). Whereas issues of food reliability and food use are inherent at all 
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levels of society, the issues of access and availability are unique to different levels of 
society. The issue of availability is implicit at both the international level (the global level) 
and at the level of the state (the national level). The issue of access is implicit at the 
household level and at the level of the individual (see appendix, figure 2.2). If conditions 
regarding adequate food availability are not met at the levels comprising the superstructure 
(at the global and the national levels), then issues of access to food at the individual and 
household levels are at risk. Availability and Access can also be labelled as Production and 
Distribution (respectively). 
Foreign aid is not regarded by this paper as being a politically neutral tool merely 
aimed at achieving functionalist goals, as is espoused by many liberal proponents; instead, 
this paper treats foreign aid as being inherently political and, therefore, is not primarily 
developmentally focused. Consequently, unfavourable outcomes are possible. Foreign aid 
impacts the food security of Malawi at all four levels – from global to individual. The 
following chapter, Chapter Three, will deal with foreign aid’s effect on Malawi’s food 
availability at the global and national levels. Chapter four will detail the impact of foreign 
aid on Malawi’s access to food at the level of the household and the individual.  
Critical to this analysis is the recognition that Malawi is not experiencing a famine. 
Famine, as detailed above, delineates a sudden collapse of the available levels of food, 
followed by high levels of acute starvation particularly among rural populations. Malawi’s 
food insecurity, on the other hand, has been on-going for over a decade, gradually 
intensifying and affecting more and more people, both rural and urban. This is a situation 
more accurately labelled as a “starvation”. If the situation in Malawi had fit the 
categorisation of a famine, foreign aid would not be a plausible contributing factor to the 
problem, since the phenomenon could easily be explained away, as a result of an “external 
shock to the system”. 
Finally, the issue of foreign aid negatively affecting a state’s food security falls into 
the four main domains of IPE – the knowledge structure, the production structure, the 
finance structure, and the security structure. Following on from this, the impact of foreign 
aid on Malawi’s food security will be assessed through the Marxist lenses of Structuralism 
and World Systems Theory as control of these different IPE structures are apparent. Foreign 
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aid, it will be argued, perpetuates the ability of the core (or Global North) to not only extract 
wealth from states in the periphery, such as Malawi, but also perpetuates the relative 
positions of the actors involved. Therefore, foreign aid helps to entrench donors’ position as 
core (rich) nations while similarly embedding aid recipients’ position in the global periphery 
(as poor nations).   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Malawi and the World: 
Trends and Realities affecting Food Security in Malawi  
 
Food security does not exist in a vacuum. The ideas and theories surrounding food security 
are not immune to politicisation, and neither are the attempts to design policy to tackle the 
issue. In order to understand one of the main arguments presented by this paper (that 
foreign aid is contributing to structural hunger in Malawi), some background elements need 
to be introduced. The following chapter will begin by outlining the international 
development and evolution of food security as a global concern to be tackled after the 
devastation of the Second World War, with memories of pre-war famine and starvation 
imprinted on the psyches of policymakers. A brief description of the evolution of trends in 
international food security will then follow into the era of price volatility before arriving at 
the contemporary post-Cold War era of food security. 
Section 3.2 will then elucidate upon the politicisation of food security, and the policy 
surrounding it, by detailing the dominant international food regime as a product of both the 
trends of food security throughout the 20th Century and hegemonic interest. The competing 
food regime – namely the food sovereignty food regime – located on the periphery of 
international discourse, will also be explored. Section 3.3 moves on to discussing recent 
food crises throughout the world in light of the prevailing, dominant, food regime. The 
various causes of food crises will also be examined before touching upon the plight of the 
third-world.  
Section 3.4 moves on from discussing food crises in the macrocosm of the 
international sphere to the microcosm of Malawi. Malawi’s last decade and a half will be 
highlighted (ranging from the turn of the century to the present day), with special emphasis 
being placed on 2002, 2006, and the years leading up to the present situation. The last 
section, section 3.5, attempts to put the information introduced in 3.4 into perspective by 
detailing the various socio-economic aspects of Malawi’s current situation. Lastly, a brief 
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description of Malawi’s reliance on aid is given with the hope of introducing the idea of aid’s 
role within Malawi.  
3.1 International Trends in Food Security 
 3.1.1 An International Concern 
As noted previously, there is a tendency to conflate the concepts of food security and 
hunger. Hunger, however, is just one aspect of food security (as discussed in the previous 
chapter) as concerns of malnutrition are equally relevant to the framework. The two ideas, 
although closely related, are not synonymous. Malnutrition denotes aspects of 
“undernutrition” (as seen in people developing anaemia from a dietary lack of iron and/or 
vitamin B12, as well as those lacking vitamin A and iodine) and “overnutrition” (present in 
those who are overweight).98    
This is an important aspect of food security to note as, internationally, food security 
remains an omnipresent concern among all states and communities since “hunger and 
malnutrition… [is] the number one challenge to… health worldwide.”99 Although the 
discourse surrounding food security is usually focussed upon issues of hunger and 
starvation, food security is as pertinent to states not facing any looming food shortages as it 
is to societies staring down the barrel of hunger and famine. In many regions of the world 
where food is abundant, the issue of quantity of food comes second to issues of quality – 
that is to say, people are “deeply concerned with the quality of [their] food [instead].”100 For 
example, issues concerning tainted meat – such as beef from infected cattle – influence 
food security concerns as much as fears concerning a shortage of meat altogether. 
Consequently, being a matter affecting all of humanity, the issue of food security is – 
and will realistically remain – a global concern. Societies not experiencing widespread 
hunger participate in the same debates as those societies more acutely affected with issues 
of hunger. These debates and dialogues have, however, preceded the contemporary 
situations in which they are implicated today. Thus, it is important to trace the “continuous 
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evolution of international food security governance”101 as well as the debates and the 
realities which have informed the discourse surrounding food security. 
3.1.2 The Post War Period 
According to Margulis (2013), one of the major international concerns following WWII was 
the experience of frequent episodes of hunger throughout the international community. Led 
by the US, efforts at rebuilding Europe and rejuvenating the global economy was guided by 
newly established international institutions, such as the Bretton Woods monetary system 
and the IBRD. With the US still recovering from the “Dust Bowl” era of ecological and 
agricultural disaster, memories of food shortage among Americans led to renewed efforts to 
achieve the goal of “eradicating hunger”.  
  The fight against hunger was firmly perceived by the US as the “international 
community's collective responsibility”, and therefore was channelled through the edifice of 
the UN. However, the creation of the Food and Agriculture Organization in 1945 – as a 
specialised agency of the UN – was at the impetus of the post-War hegemon, the USA. The 
FAO’s initial mandate sought to tackle food shortages through coordinating international 
“grain production and trade” so as to more easily redistribute surplus among states in need 
of assistance. Soon after its creation, however, major grain producing states (such as the 
USA, Canada, and Australia) “did not fully support international coordination and instead 
steered the FAO to focus its work” on improving macroeconomic policies of developing 
countries, especially in areas of food and agricultural management. As Lee (2013) states: “In 
the post-war global North, agricultural productivist frameworks prioritised national self-
sufficiency.”102 
 However, a perceived Malthusian pressure began to build among the developing 
world. As rates of growth in food production failed to keep pace with the “rapid population 
growth” of the 1960s, fears of an “impending world food shortage.”103 loomed large. What 
was originally mandated for the FAO was insourced to a subsidiary – the World Food 
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Program. Finally, “multiple humanitarian [and] trade” objectives were being tackled in the 
global South, with “domestic farm policy objectives of the main aid donors”104 also 
benefitting from this interaction. The cross pollination of developing capital and expertise 
with local realities in the developed world led to “technological transfers and the 
introduction of higher-yield seed varieties, fertilizers, and pesticides”, leading to a boom in 
production – commonly referred to as the Green Revolution. This intensification in 
agricultural practices had increased the global supply of food approximately 2.5% per year 
(1960-2005).105  
3.1.3 The Era of Price Volatility 
Despite the gains made by an increase in global production, many countries were still facing 
looming food shortages. With the majority of the world being net importers of food, a 
“scramble” amongst most of the developed world ensued in order to shore up sources of 
supply.106 This insatiable demand, however, ensured that global prices for basic 
commodities swelled. This, for many, was considered as the first major food crisis in the 
post-War era and “revealed a new driver of hunger to policymakers: price volatility”107 and 
the uncertainty of a reliable food supply from an internationalised set of markets. 
 The fear of a sudden shock to the international price of food supplies soon became a 
reality after oil-producing nations (OPEC), unilaterally raised the price of oil and petroleum 
in 1973108 from US $2.90 per barrel to US $11.65 per barrel – “a jump of over 400 
percent.”109 Due to the largely intertwined global economy, the impact of the oil shock was 
severe. Industry across the globe faltered, and food prices skyrocketed as transport and 
production costs were dependent upon oil. The already strained international market for 
food was, subsequently, put beyond the reach of most of the developing world.  
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 Policy makers, aware of the correlation between price volatility and global food 
insecurity, “challenged assumptions about how world food markets worked.”110 In 1974, 
policy makers at the FAO organised the World Food Conference, which spawned “[s]everal 
new international institutions”111 (such as the International Fund for Agriculture and 
Development) in order to tackle emerging sources of food insecurity as related to market 
forces. At this point, major crises to global food security had been met, on three separate 
occasions, by the creation of a multilateral institution – the FAO, the WFP, and the IFAD.  
Although each institution was created in response to major problems in international food 
trends, the urgency behind each organisation waned as soon as the return of stability on 
international food markets”112 re-established the pre-crisis status quo. 
3.1.4 Post Cold-War Reality 
As stated above, with the advent of the post-War efforts at rebuilding Europe and 
strengthening international governance, global agricultural production increased 
dramatically. “However”, as one can infer from the narrative, “after nearly 40 years, hunger 
and malnutrition issues [were] still great challenges to the world.”113 In 2005, the FAO 
released figures stating that, on average, nearly six million children die each year from 
hunger or malnutrition. In 2010, the FAO estimated that 925 million people were 
undernourished – close to one seventh of humanity. It is estimated that 98% of these 925 
million people are located in the developing world.114 As of 2014,115 the number had fallen 
to 805 million undernourished people.116  
 Despite the stellar improvement, the number remains high and, largely, 
geographically distinguishable with high rates of undernourishment in Africa and Western-
Asia.117  Although global levels of undernourishment have fallen, in parts of the developing 
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world “[t]he number of hungry people in the developing countries as a group was however 
elevated.”118  
 The construction of increasingly complex and integrated international food supply 
chains has led to an implicit reliance on a “trade-oriented notion of food security.”119 This 
trade oriented food regime has also led to a rise in “agri-food export chains [in the Global 
South] servicing retail markets in the global North.”120 The problem, therefore, seems 
paradoxical – with food insecure nations exporting food to largely food secure nations. With 
this in mind, the problem “cannot be simply reduced to issues of poverty and food 
supply.”121 
 
3.2 International Food Regimes 
3.2.1 Food Regime Theory 
As noted above, there seems to be a paradox in the efforts at promoting a food secure 
world. With decades of endeavour, bolstered by numerous multilateral organisations, the 
problem persists and, in some locations, intensifies. Although the international post-War 
narrative demonstrates the trends and attitudes in policy-making surrounding international 
food security, it fails to challenge and discern the cause of these trends. Food security is 
inherently informed by a material reality (by the quantity and quality of food). This, 
however, is a simplistic reduction of the issue and faces the critique similarly faced by 
strands of Realism: that the material world is not the sole driver behind action and policy-
making. 
What is absent in the prevailing narrative, therefore, is the role played by the 
ideological framework in guiding international food security’s post-War trajectory. Ideology, 
as understood in this context, is informed by a set of “[n]orms, ideas, and identities” – all of 
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which play a critical role in international relations “alongside material factors.”122 As 
described by Margulis (2013), norms are important as they are: 
“the underlying cognitive frameworks that shape actors' identities and 
preferences and construct the principles, rules, and institutions that constitute 
the international system.”123 
In this regard, Food Regime Theory (or food systems theory) is a pertinent fit as “[regimes], 
as used here, refers to the sets of norms and principles that apply to an issue area.”124 Food 
regime theory is a useful point of departure in understanding the paradox of a world still 
seemingly at risk of food insecurity despite decades of intervention. Food regime theory is 
an attempt at uncovering and explaining prevailing attitudes, norms, identities, ideas, and 
preconceptions which guide policy-making on issues of food security.  
Food regime theory, in its broadest conception, is a taxonomical attempt at ordering 
and organising schools of thought surrounding policy approaches dealing with food security. 
Having Marxist roots (from the World Systems Theory school), the theory tends to organise 
schools of thought into “dominant” (read core) regimes and “emerging” (read peripheral) 
regimes. Food regime theory does face the critique that by focusing on policy at the 
international level, the theory is blind to the intricacies and realities present within the 
lower, nested levels of the international system – that is to say, that the food regime 
framework, to use the expression, focuses on the forest at the expense of the trees. This is a 
similar critique levelled against Kenneth Waltz’s third image-centric, structural neorealism. 
Its strength, however, is also applicable to food regime theory as a structural paradigm. As 
with neorealism, there is an assumption that the different levels of the international system 
are nested; therefore, although emphasis is placed on the topmost level (the international 
level), the superstructure does affect the national, household, and individual levels as well. 
A ripple at the top can cause waves at the bottom. 
 Through the lens of food regimes theory, this paper will thus turn its attention to the 
dominant international food regime before contrasting and comparing it to the emerging 
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counter (and perhaps retaliatory) food regime. Both will be traced through their evolutions 
parallel to the trends in global food security (as elucidated upon previously). 
3.2.2 The Dominant/Core Food Regime 
Perhaps the best summary of the dominant regime comes from the former deputy director 
of the WTO, Miguel Rodríguez Mendoza, who stated that: “national food security strategies 
should be premised upon international trade.”125  
Phillip McMichael (considered to be one of the founders of food regime theory 
alongside Harriet Friedman) states that the current corporate food regime “was 
institutionalized (sic) via WTO rules and protocols” which privilege “agro-exporters from the 
US and Europe in global food markets.”126 This privilege is also entrenched in light of the 
trend in rising agri-food exports from food insecure nations in the Global South to the 
Global North.127 The current status quo – which favours the industrialised, Global North - is 
the result of decades of institutionalisation following the Second World War, instilled via 
numerous multilateral organisations, often overriding the actions of the institutions 
designed to promote food security. 
As discussed previously, in the post-War era, the US-led Global North embarked upon 
the rebuilding process cognisant of the need for international cooperation and coordination 
between the various actors involved – thus spawning a myriad of IGOs. As highlighted 
previously, specialist agencies dealing with food (such as the FAO, WFP, and IFAD) were set 
up specifically to deal with international issues concerning food security. However, although 
these specialised organisations were considered to be the main drivers for promoting 
positive policies concerning food security, they were limited and constrained by the 
mandates of non-food oriented IGOs. Other organisations set up in the milieu following the 
end of the Second World War, such as the IMF, the IBRD, ITO and GATT (to become WTO), 
have systematically instilled the idea that:  
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“food security [is] premised upon international trade and the maximisation of 
comparative advantage between countries producing export commodities and 
food products.”128 
This mantra is important to note as it essentially constrains the efforts of the specialist 
agencies (such as the FAO) by forcing them to work within the constraints of a larger 
neoliberal framework governing interactions across many spheres, setting up a “neoliberal 
agro-industrial food regime.”129 Menezes (2001) writes that modern food security remains 
threatened by (amongst other things) both: “[the] trade deregulation and economic policies 
designed to usher in structural adjustments; [and the] trade regulations imposed by spheres 
outside the countries [at risk].”130 Both these threats, however, are seen in a different light 
from the vantage point of advocates of neoliberal practices: they argue that all actors will be 
food secure if they take advantage of their comparative advantage. This, in effect, puts any 
blame of food insecurity on the actor and their inability to take full advantage of the 
comparative advantage.  
 3.2.3 The Emerging/Peripheral Food Regime 
The discourse around the above-mentioned corporate, trade-oriented food regime implicitly 
“argues that moving towards food self-sufficiency poses a threat to food security.”131 This 
food regime suggests that, thanks to comparative advantage, a state or society does not 
need to grow its own food as a prerequisite to be food secure as self-sufficiency lies in the 
actor’s ability to trade. With markets taking centre stage in the discourse on food security 
within this prevailing corporate food regime, IGOs and multilateral processes favouring 
trade-deregulation have become both highly contested and protested. A pointed example of 
this is the stalled Doha round of the WTO debate. 
 Neoliberal markets have become a hallmark of globalisation. Globalisation has also 
led to an increased number of participants engaging IGOs and multilateral talks, thus 
fermenting an opposition to the dominant food regime. La Via Campesina, an international 
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peasant’s movement,132 has popularised a food regime to challenge the prevailing one; it is 
known as the food sovereignty movement. Lee (2013) has labelled it an oppositional and 
populist social movement.133 La Via Campesina defines the food sovereignty movement as: 
“the right of each nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce the 
staple foods of its peoples, respecting productive and cultural diversity.”134 
 As such, supporters of the idea of food sovereignty “rebuts the trade deregulation 
process[es]” as well as “economic policies [which usher in] structural adjustments”135 
promoting neoliberal practices. It is in stark contrast to the idea espoused by the prevailing 
trade-oriented food regime which argues that trade deregulation and free trade are the 
drivers of food security. According to the discourse surrounding food sovereignty, these 
practices promote “hunger and poverty all over the world, [while] destroying local 
production capacities and impoverishing rural societies to an increasing extent.”136  
 Ultimately, the two regimes (the trade-oriented food regime and the food 
sovereignty food regime) appear to be irreconcilable paradigms. 
3.3 Recent Food Crises 
3.3.1 The Regime in Practice 
The emergent food sovereignty movement has been fuelled by the dissonance apparent in 
the wake of the hegemonic food regime; in the incongruity between theory and praxis. 
While proponents of the neoliberal, trade-oriented model espouse food security through 
unfettered trade, much of the world lacks the requirements to ensure their food security 
under the rules of the hegemonic framework – namely, globally competitive economies. 
This incongruence between the “accepted” routes to food security, as instilled via the 
dominant food regime, with the situational reality becomes increasingly stark given the 
numerous food crises experienced throughout the world at both the local and international 
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levels. Severe fluctuations in food supply do not only fuel food shortages but, as a result of 
the forces of supply and demand, also affects the access to food.  
3.3.2 Food Crises 
As Berazneva and Lee,137 Margulis,138 McMichael,139 Menezes,140 and Minot141 have all 
implicitly illustrated through their work on recent food related disasters, modern food crises 
are largely associated with elevated food prices. At this point in history, food shortages 
cannot be equated to a lack in supply as “the world produces enough food to feed 
everyone”142 (a sentiment echoed by multiple IGOs and INGOs, such as the WFP,143 
OXFAM,144 and the WHO145). Using a 2012 study on crop yields, it has been estimated that 
global outputs of food production was (at the time of the article’s publishing in 2012) 
sufficient to sustain 10 billion people, approximately three billion people more than the 
current global population status quo.146 However, despite this abundance of food, food 
crises still occur. As Thurow writes: 
“Even now, enough food is being produced to adequately feed every person on 
the planet; the fact that nearly one billion people are nonetheless going hungry is 
a damning indictment of the world’s food-distribution system.”147 
Much of the world’s food problems stem from apprehension over long-term 
concerns potentially caused by changes in global climate; not in the objective changes in 
current levels of food produced worldwide. Estimates indicate a 10-20% global increase in 
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food insecure people by the year 2050 as a result of climate-driven changes.148 These 
speculation-fuelling concerns are nourished by evidence of: 
“higher average temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, rising sea levels, and 
increases in the frequency, variability and unpredictability of extreme weather 
events such as droughts, floods and cyclones.”149 
Africa, presently facing the brunt of an international food supply subject to speculation, “is 
already under pressure from climate stresses.”150 Consequently, intensified by global 
concerns over food production, policy makers expect “widespread disruption of socio-
economic conditions” if these concerns over climate instability do materialise.151  
Violence and social disruption are, however, already apparent - food price hikes in 
early 2008 sparked protests across the globe, with many protests turning violent.152 
International grain prices (considered as the most important staple food crop due to its 
widespread consumption)153 had become increasingly volatile in the years between 2007 
and 2010 before plateauing at a stable rate.154 Although prices are increasingly stable, 
Minot argues that attention “should be given to the (high) level of food prices… rather than 
volatility per se” as prices do remain unrealistically high for many to ensure food secure 
existences.155  
In addition to speculation over future crop yields affected by uncertain climates, 
other causes of the global food price hikes are what Margulis has labelled as the perfect 
storm of: “surging energy prices, biofuel policies, food trade bans, and speculation on [non-
agricultural] commodities markets.”156 Increases in oil price led to increases in fertiliser 
price, “as well as the cost of trucking food from farms to local markets and shipping it 
abroad.”157 Another big contributor is part oil-driven, part climate-driven as policymakers 
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seek alternatives in the form of bio-fuels, effectively siphoning away large segments of crop 
yields previously destined for human consumption – this results in less food, and higher 
prices.158 
Finally, changing diets in a world characterised by rapid urbanisation, and under a 
food regime promoting “the logic of the comparative advantage” has stimulated the 
creation of a globally homogenised diet, “destroying age old eating habits.”159 Westernising 
the diets of a rising middle class in countries such as China and India has elevated demand 
for meat. Subsequently, more staple crops – such as grain – are being diverted to feed 
livestock. In 2010, Weis noted that “about half of global grain production is consumed 
directly… while 35% feeds livestock and 17% is dedicated to biofuel production.”160 To 
highlight the complexity of the global food network, it is pertinent to consider the fact that 
most food crises are caused by short term food-shortages whereas the food-price hikes 
experienced from 2008 onwards came during a period “when the world's farmers reaped a 
record grain crop.”161 
Minot notes that “[it] is almost universally accepted that food prices in Africa have 
become more volatile in recent years.”162 Africa, however, is not alone in experiencing food 
price volatility – both emerging powers (such as India and China) and developing, “third 
world” countries experience (and are cognisant of) food price volatility163 – the global price 
of rice, for instance, “shot up by 255%” in four years “while wheat and maize prices rose by 
80–90%” in the same time period.164 Although these are aggregated estimates, these prices 
where experienced at different levels of severity in different locations. As Beraneza and Lee 
highlight, “many African countries do not commonly have any safety net programs in 
place,”165 and as a result many African states faced these price increases without being able 
to mitigate the impact on their citizens. This trend comes in light of the world’s eyes turning 
to Africa – seen as the potential “final frontier” for a revolution in agricultural production 
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needed to out-produce the demand of a projected nine billion people in 2050.166 Once 
again, it bares reminding that the current global production outpaces even the projections 
of earth’s 2050 population size. 
In 2010 and 2011, global food prices again experienced a sharp increase, resulting 
once again in “widespread global speculation about a looming ‘great food crisis’.”167 This 
global debate on food insecurity was further stoked by the effects that volatile food prices 
were seemingly having on the polities of Africa and the Middle East, with calls for “bread 
and freedom” being used by social movements against “long-standing autocratic regimes” 
(such as was the case in both Egypt and Tunisia’s respective revolutionary movements).168 
Unfortunately, speculation on the future of food availability acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy, 
as it can be partly attributed as a factor in pushing the price of food up.169 
As noted, global food production far exceeds that which is needed by the current 
global population. This illustrates the misdiagnosis of hunger and starvation in many cases 
throughout the decades since the Green Revolution of the 1960s, as many of the most vivid 
examples of mass starvation accompanies local droughts while being mislabelled as 
“famines” (most notably among these is the case of Ethiopia in the 1980s). The logic of this 
claim follows as such: a drought localised in a part of the world should, in theory, have 
minimal impact on food security of the drought-affected nations if the world does indeed 
produce more than what is needed; it is thus not an issue of supply (as denoted by the label 
“famine”) but an issue of access. 
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3.4 Malawi’s Food Crises 
3.4.1 Early 21st Century 
The start of the 21st century saw Malawi experiencing relative food stability in part thanks to 
two preceding years of good harvests (between 1998 and 2000). By 2001, however, a 
sudden shock to Malawi in the form of “localised floods [had] reduced the 2000/01 maize 
harvest” by 237,000 metric tonnes.170 This loss equated to 30% of local maize production 
and resulted in a 300% increase in the price of the staple food-crop.171 In the year following 
this shock, and in the absence of major carryover stock from previous seasons,172 thousands 
of Malawians reportedly died from starvation and malnutrition173 while “one third of the 
[state’s] population [became] dependent on food aid.”174 Due to the knock-on effect had by 
the previous season’s shock, the following year’s grain output had dropped by another 
10%.175 
In light of these events, Dorward and Kydd (2004) ask how such “relatively mild 
weather shocks” (in comparison to the previous agricultural disasters) could snowball into a 
food crisis176 as “the climatic shock was not a typical for the region.”177 Hajdu et al. ask a 
similar question, stating that despite the relative mildness of the shock to local grain 
production, the 2002 food crisis had (unexpectedly) caused “many more deaths.”178 The 
rainfall causing the flooding, for example, although erratic, [was] average for the 2001-2 
season.179 Even more worrying was that the food crisis did not seem to be limited to Malawi 
as 14 million people in Southern Africa were at risk of food shortages; 6 million of these 14 
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million were located in Mozambique, Zambia, and Malawi.180 Malawi was, with over 3.2 
million people at risk, the region’s worst affected nation.181 
Across the region, as mentioned above, food aid was being delivered so as to 
prevent a huge loss of life. However, in many cases, the impact of the food shortage had 
already taken a toll on many people who had resorted to “high-risk strategies to survive” – 
such as consuming potentially poisonous plants, cutting caloric intake to extend food 
supplies, stealing crops, or in some cases, resorting to prostitution and other criminal 
activities.182 This last survival strategy is a poignant indication that the problem was not a 
lack of food per se, but an increase in food-prices. 
On the 27th February, 2002, Malawian President Bakili Muluzi declared a state of 
emergency.183 The remainder of 2002 saw Malawi “desperately mobilizing resources to 
import some 585,000 tonnes to fill the 2002 food gap” – a tactic which Malawi’s former 
Chief Economist, Dr Kalonga Stambuli, labelled as “an act of firefighting.”184 At the time, 
Malawi was spending more on grain imports than petroleum.185 By 2005, the country had 
designated ‘agriculture and food security’ as a number one priority in its Growth and 
Development Strategy “emphasising how important the issue of food security is in present-
day Malawi.”186 The importance of food security to Malawi runs beyond the human aspect – 
Sahley (2005) reports that the state’s legitimacy “depends heavily on the availability and 
affordability of maize.”187 As Bookstein and Lawson highlight, a large contributing factor to 
vulnerability to food crises is the inadequacy of agricultural policies, justifying the need for 
Malawi (and other states across the region) to revaluate their food security strategy.188 
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3.4.2 Six Years of Hunger 
2005’s re-emphasis on policy surrounding food security was timely, as Malawi faced yet 
more food shortages. As before, locals blamed “the food shortages on drought and a bad 
harvest.”189 The reality, however, mirrored the situation in 2002: although rainfall had been 
erratic, “it was by no means a disaster situation.”190 Even on the surface, the shortage was 
not apparent - it was reported that livestock were not dying, and that hospitals were not 
experiencing a “siege by the starving” as before.191 This deceptive nature of the crisis led 
OXFAM to note that it was one of the "less visible crises".  
Ultimately, it was estimated that 4.7 million people in Malawi, a third of the 
population, were under threat of food shortages throughout the crisis.192 Between 2001 and 
2005, Malawi had faced chronic food shortages, with many people expecting an annual lean 
season “from December up to the March/April harvest”193 – 2005 marked a sixth season 
characterised by food shortages across Malawi.194 Women and children were 
disproportionately hard hit by the crisis – Menon reports that of the 4.7 million people at 
risk during the crisis, 2.2 million were under the age of 18; 750, 000 of these 2.2 million 
people were under the age of five. Hospitals throughout Malawi were eventually besieged 
by the starving and treated, on average, 29% more children for conditions related to 
malnutrition (such as kwashiorkor), with some regions experiencing a 40% increase in 
malnutrition-related hospital admissions.195  
 During such situations, where international food aid is provided, INGOs and IGOs 
such as the WFP rely on foresight, as “it can take up to four months to move food from 
abroad to the affected region.”196 It is unfortunate, therefore, that the crisis starting in 2005 
had not been sufficiently foreseen as even international relief agencies had “been taken by 
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surprise by the emerging scale of the problem.”197 In these cases, agencies rely on private 
donations to source food from local markets what would otherwise be sourced from 
abroad. The fact that this is an option points to the crisis not being one of supply, as the 
many labels of famine would suggest. 
3.4.3 Contemporary Food Crises 
The cycle of chronic hunger throughout Malawi continued past 2005. Inaccurate projections 
of the state’s future harvests from 2005 onwards exacerbated slight shocks – in 2007, for 
example, the Malawian government estimated that the yearly maize crop will yield 1.2 
million tonnes; on the basis of this projection, the national government aimed to sell 
400,000 tonnes of grain to struggling Zimbabwe. The projection, however, had been 
elevated and, consequently, exacerbated a food crisis that could have been weathered with 
government reserves.198 The inaccurate projection led to grain prices skyrocketing. 
Early 2008 saw warnings of a possible food crisis in 2009 across the region.199 At the 
time of the publication of a study detailing the looming crisis, maize prices in Malawi were 
“near historic highs in inflation-adjusted terms.”200 Government responded to the price 
shock in staple foods by imposing various trade caps (for example, imposing a fixed rate of 
52 kwacha per kilogram – approximately US $0.30 in 2008 – for small scale traders), 
subsidising farmers, and banning private sale of grain. Government also enabled the 
parastatal ADMARC (Malawi’s Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation) to 
attempt to control grain prices via quantative easing and buying of excess grain.201 
Despite these events, mixed messages were being received by many – by 2010, 
Malawi was being “celebrated… as the scene of a modest Green Revolution,”202 with some 
asking whether this was “a [potential] model for Africa.”203 By 2011, however, people were 
experiencing acute hunger once more – this time, no drought or weather shock was present 
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and “there was plenty of food in the markets.”204 Staple food prices increased dramatically: 
maize prices rose by 50%,205 leading to calls for rationing and government subsidies. By 
2012, grain exports were banned as the hunger problem intensified.206 Pertinent to note is 
the seemingly paradoxical fact that Malawi had experienced “a bumper harvest of 3, 2 
million tonnes of maize against a national consumption of 2, 4 million tonnes.”207 Despite all 
the supposed success of Malawi’s “Green Revolution”, as well as government subsidy 
programs, 1.7 million people faced a food crisis.208 
2013 and 2014 followed suit as hunger remained a problem. By 2015, Malawi once 
again experienced a shock in the form of erratic weather – flooding throughout the region 
left displaced households in Malawi, according to the Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network, in “crisis.”209 The flooding, however, also affected Malawians not stricken by 
flooding as maize production dropped by 27.7%, while other crops experienced projected 
losses as well, triggering fears of impending widespread hunger throughout the nation.210 
3.5 Malawi in Context 
Food insecurity in Malawi does not exist within a vacuum – in addition to the global trends 
in food security, politicised food regimes, and global food crises, Malawi’s socioeconomic 
situation plays a crucial role. As such, an introduction to Malawi’s socioeconomic reality is 
vital in contextualising the state’s food problem. Additionally, the issue of foreign aid’s 
presence in Malawi will be touched upon since aid exerts significant pressure in shaping the 
socioeconomic situation of Malawi. Lastly, the discussion surrounding Malawi’s 
socioeconomic reality and the role of foreign aid has thereupon, presents a basis for the 
argument that is to follow in Chapter 4.  
 
                                                            
204 Vidal, 2011 
205 Nyasa Times, 2011 
206 Nyasa Times, 2012 
207 Nyasa Times, 2012 
208 Nyasa Times, 2012 
209 Wells, 2015 
210 M’bwana, 2015 
Page | 53  
 
3.5.1 Socio-Economic Overview 
With a population size of 17,3 million, Malawi is one of the smaller nations in 
Southern Africa. However, with a population of 17 million, the aforementioned food crises 
are put into perspective – the 2002 food crisis left an estimated 3.2 million people at risk of 
starvation, a third of the population in 2002.  In 2005, 4.7 million people were at risk – also 
equating to one third of the country’s population.  
 As of 2014, only 16.1% of Malawians live in urban areas. This largely rural-
based populace is driven by the nature of the state’s economy. As the country’s economy is 
largely agricultural, most of the population remain close to rural areas for sources of 
agricultural-based work. The role of agriculture in Malawi cannot be understated, as it 
“accounts for about one-third of [Malawi’s] GDP and 90% of [the state’s] export revenues” – 
approximately US $1.198 billion of an estimated US $1.332 billion. Conversely, Malawi 
imports goods worth approximately US $2.498 billion; this leaves the country with a trade 
deficit of US $1.166 billion, almost the same amount earned via exports. This trade deficit 
severely constrains government spending – national debt runs at 48% of the country’s GDP 
of US $4.408 billion (2014 estimates). 
So far, in discussing the various food crises which Malawi has experienced over the 
past decade and a half, maize has been highlighted as a crucial crop. It is, however, not the 
prime component of its agricultural sector, and therefore economy; “the performance of 
the tobacco sector is [the] key to short-term growth as tobacco accounts for more than half 
of exports”.  In fact, as a percentage of all agricultural products, tobacco makes up 53% of all 
exports. The next four biggest earners are: tea, coffee, sugar, cotton. Malawi’s four biggest 
expenses, conversely, are importing: food, petroleum goods, semi-manufactures, and 
consumer goods.  
Imports are also disproportionately more expensive than imports to neighbouring 
states – this is due to a multitude of negative externalities, the largest being the fact that 
Malawi (as a landlocked nation) has no access to ports beyond lake Malawi/Nyasa. 
Furthermore, poor transport infrastructure pushes up the prices of goods transported from 
the coast. 
Page | 54  
 
Of Malawi’s 17.3 million people, 46.9% are children under the age of 14; the 15-24 
year old age group makes up 20.2% of the population. One implication of this highly skewed 
demographic makeup is that Malawi’s labour force is only 5.74 million people – 33.17% of 
the population. In effect, every labourer acts as a breadwinner for three people (including 
themselves). This puts Malawi’s GDP per capita of US $800 into perspective. A further 
caveat to contextualise the earning power of the country’s labourers is that Malawi’s GINI 
coefficient is 0.462 – almost halfway between complete equality and inequality. 
Malawi experiences some of the world’s highest levels of growth at an average of 7% 
between 2009 and 2014.211 However, much of this growth is seemingly unsustainable as it 
relies on government expenditure on the agricultural sector (as mentioned above) – a policy 
which Malawi’s government cannot sustain while in debt. Beyond the unsustainable nature 
of policies promoting growth, the advances made are expected to fall flat if certain 
obstacles are not confronted. One of the biggest obstacles to Malawi’s high levels of growth 
is the country’s electricity problem – less than one out of ten Malawians have access to 
electricity, and even those with access “enjoy the services… half the time” as “electricity 
supply is intermittent like disco lights.”212 Overall, the public service delivery system is dire – 
along with chronic food crises, Malawi also undergoes chronic water shortages, partly due 
to external shocks and partly due to mismanagement of utilities.213 All these factors have 
traditionally kept foreign direct investment away from Malawi, despite the country’s stellar 
growth over the past half a decade. 
3.5.2 Foreign Aid and Scandals 
Malawi’s post-colonial history has been replete with foreign aid. Over the past decade and a 
half, for example, foreign aid has comprised “40 percent of the national budget [and]… has 
contributed approximately a fifth of the country’s gross national income”214 - this equates 
to, approximately, US $505.6 million and US $881.6 million respectively. To state that 
Malawi is dependent on the foreign aid it receives would be an understatement. Foreign 
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aid, it has been argued, has enabled Malawi’s government to spur short term growth via the 
various short term agricultural programs (mentioned above).215 
 Despite this injection of much needed funds, however, the state remains poor and 
unable to provide much needed services to the nation. Misuse of funds has also been a 
problem – in 2010, it was uncovered that the then president, President Bingu Wa 
Mutharika, had purchased a private jet for executive use using US $13.26 million of donor 
money.216 It is this very visible misappropriation of aid and inability to provide for 
Malawians which has ignited public protests against government on numerous occasions – 
in 2011, for example, protests and rioting broke out across Malawi ultimately leading to 
police and military intervention, resulting in 19 deaths.217 The uncovering of the purchase of 
the jet led to withdrawal of a portion of aid by donor countries such as Britain, before later 
suspending aid altogether due to the “economic mismanagement and poor governance.”218  
 After President Bingu Wa Mutharika’s sudden death in April of 2012, Vice President 
Joyce Banda took charge of the executive role. One of her first acts was to sell off the 
private Jet in order to assist Malawians facing food crises.219 She also planned to sell off 
additional luxury items bought by government, such as 60 Mercedes Benz vehicles used by 
MPs and other members of government in addition to cutting her own salary by 30%.220 Aid 
returned to Malawi. Unfortunately, the goodwill was short-lived as the “Cashgate” scandal 
sullied the positive perception of Malawian government created by Joyce Banda.  
 The Cashgate scandal is the moniker given to the “systematic looting of public 
money” by government officials during President Banda’s short tenure.221 Investigations 
surrounding the Cashgate scandal revealed that “[e]stimates indicate that 35 percent of 
government funds may have vanished over the last decade.”222 Donors immediately 
withdrew aid worth US $150 million in response to the revelations.223 At the time of writing, 
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some of the aid has returned to Malawi, however, there are calls once more for cutting aid 
to Malawi as new president, Peter Mutharika, has reportedly suggested buying another jet 
for presidential use.224 As before, donors are threatening to withdraw aid from the nation. 
3.6 Summary 
As stated in the introduction, food security does not exist in a vacuum. In order to 
comprehend the complexity of the political aspect of modern food security, the various 
contributing elements have been introduced in an attempt to contextualise food insecurity 
in Malawi.  Section 3.1 presented a narrative of international food security trends, 
highlighting the responses by global powers to international food insecurity throughout the 
20th century. It also implicitly emphasised the role played by global powers, which was then 
underlined in section 3.2. The discussion then demonstrates the role played by global 
powers in dictating policy. The dominant food regime, it has been argued, is shaped by the 
global north to favour policy born out of the neoliberal beliefs centred upon free trade. This 
food regime was contrasted to the opposing, peripheral regime – the food sovereignty 
regime – which opposes the pre-eminence placed upon neoliberal trade as a route to food 
security.  
 Section 3.3 shifted attention towards recent global crises in food, to be understood 
in context of the discussions on both the global trends and food regimes. In discussing 
recent food crises, the issue of price was demonstrated as being the key concern when 
discussing modern food crises. Various factors given for food crises were also presented – 
such as changes in diets and concerns over climate change. Section 3.4 introduces Malawi’s 
struggle with hunger over the past decade and a half. It focuses on the major food crises of 
2002 and 2005-2006 before outlining the trend of continued, chronic hunger throughout 
the years leading up to the present (2015). Lastly, 3.5 puts the situation of chronic food 
crises in Malawi into further context by detailing Malawi’s socioeconomic reality, placing 
special emphasis on foreign aid as it accounts for much of Malawi’s national budget. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Aid, Dependency, and Starvation: 
How aid can perpetuate food crises in Malawi  
 
The argument put forth by this thesis states that foreign aid plays a role in perpetuating 
chronic food crises within Malawi. To illustrate, the following will attempt to demonstrate 
the logical reasoning behind the argument, starting with a critique of foreign aid by 
highlighting possible negative outcomes. It will then propose that food security in Malawi is 
premised upon access, not availability, before demonstrating how foreign aid negatively 
impacts Malawi’s ability to economically access food.  
 
4.1 Critiquing Foreign Aid 
As Jean-Phillipe Thérien notes, “Left and Right are notions little used in the study of 
international relations,” but among other fields the classification “has long been recognised 
as a meaningful distinction.”225 The critique against foreign aid can benefit from this 
distinction as well, despite its international nature, as a large proportion of the critique is 
based upon economic and social claims entrenched in left-right discourse. Critique comes 
from both sides of this often-used political spectrum as opponents and proponents of 
government intervention present critique of the purpose and effects of foreign aid on 
recipients.  
4.1.1 Critique from the Right 
Aid has been criticised from various fronts; however, it should come as no surprise that a 
large proportion of the critique comes from liberal economics. The neoliberal zeitgeist 
which dictates international economic interaction experienced a renaissance in the 1980s. 
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Although challenged, contemporary international relations remain largely guided by 
neoliberal standards.  
The idea of government intervention in economic affairs, it is argued, is a 
“perversion of market forces” whereby artificial demand or supply forces are introduced.226 
Milton Friedman, the Nobel Prize winning advocate of free market economics, did support 
the idea of military aid but was opposed to the idea of economic aid which encourages 
development by “requiring comprehensive planning and control by [the donor or recipient] 
government.”227 
Peter Bauer, a contemporary of Friedman’s, opposed the idea of development aid at 
an even more fundamental level. Bauer questioned the raison d’être behind foreign aid, 
challenging the logic behind the role played by foreign financial support provided by donors. 
This traditional logic follows that because underdeveloped countries are poor, they cannot 
generate the capital to develop; and without development, these countries remain poor. 
Aid, therefore, plays the role of the needed capital in order to stimulate development. 
Bauer disputed this fundamental characteristic behind aid by asking: “how did any other rich 
countries ever become rich [if] they all started out poor?”228  Thomas Sowell points out that 
this idea of stimulating development by providing capital was traditionally not questioned 
and was considered “conventional wisdom” prior to the 1980s’ resurgence of liberal 
economic norms.229  
In addition to this line of questioning of foreign aid’s purpose, Bauer highlights the 
oft-lamented concern of donor publics regarding corruption, stating that: “[b]ecause aid 
accrues to the government, it increases its resources, patronage, and power in relation to 
the rest of society.”230 As a result, not only is a recipient government’s influence on society 
enhanced via the increased opportunity for patronage, but the addition in centralised 
financial resources “increases the stakes in the struggle for power,” potentially harming 
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democratic efforts by incentivising government positions as a means of personal 
enrichment.231  
In recent years, the neoliberal argument against foreign aid has been popularised 
and reintroduced to the public through the economist Dambisa Moyo’s diagnosis of aid in 
Africa (labelling it Dead Aid).232 Moyo critiques Africa’s current aid-fuelled development 
paths along the same lines as Friedman, Sowell, and Bauer. Aid to African states, she argues, 
“chokes off the export sector and results in laziness on the part of African policy makers” as 
they are not incentivised to “pursue tax revenues” (since foreign aid props up government 
budgets instead).233 Services which should be funded via tax revenues are funded instead by 
foreign aid, effectively removing a degree of accountability and feedback between 
government and the electorate.234 An additional critique lobbed against aid in Africa is 
shared by critics from the left of the political spectrum – namely, that foreign aid strips 
agency from recipient nations in lieu of aid conditions imposed by donors. 
4.1.2 Critique from the Left 
Modern standards of foreign aid have “remained biased in favour of those developing 
countries that adopt market-friendly economic policies.”235 In spite of this, the international 
donor community has come to accept “that macro-economic discipline does not 
[necessarily] suffice” in attempting to curb or reverse poverty.236 As such, critique of 
poverty-reducing efforts from the political left has been re-examined.  
According to Thérien, three major areas of critique (stemming from the political left) 
exists surrounding foreign aid’s purpose as a tool for poverty-reduction. The first issue 
echoes the apprehension of the political right concerning the misuse of funds and resources 
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as “developed countries devote few concrete efforts to poverty alleviation.”237 Secondly, 
foreign aid as development assistance, it is argued, does not: 
“take into account the fact that the Third World is also affected by the policies of 
the developed countries in the areas of commerce, finance, agriculture, the 
environment and immigration.”238 
The third issue relates to the second critique, but expands upon the idea: certain 
critics “[see] aid as one element in a broader neo-colonial project” whereby aid 
“corresponds to the interests and values of the developed countries.”239 The issue of “tied 
aid”, or aid which is provided with strict conditionality, provides much of the kindling for the 
idea of a donor exploiting recipients dependent on aid through stipulations “enshrining the 
Washington Consensus.”240 
4.2 Foreign Aid and Food Security 
4.2.1 Access, not Availability 
Food security, as delineated previously, is reliant on four elements: availability, access, 
reliability, and food use241 - if any one of these elements is missing, food insecurity is 
present. The label of famine is oft given to all food crises – however, famine denotes the 
absence of availability of food. Malawi’s multi-decade food crisis is frequently labelled as a 
famine – for example, both the 2002 and 2005 food shocks were labelled as famines by the 
media.242 
 However, as multiple IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs have echoed, “the world produces 
enough food to feed everyone.”243 Some estimates indicate that the world produces enough 
to feed 10 billion people, an estimate which is rising as food production technologies 
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advance.244 This sentiment, however, must be viewed in context of the prevailing 
international food regime – “the underlying cognitive frameworks that shape actors' 
identities and preferences and construct the principles, rules, and institutions”245 – which 
dictates that: 
“food security [is] premised upon international trade and the maximisation of 
comparative advantage between countries producing export commodities and 
food products.”246 
Famine, in the context of global supply and international norms of food security, is only 
possible if the location in question is isolated from the international community and is self-
reliant. Malawi does not fall into this category; it is neither an international pariah (such as 
North Korea) nor attempting food self-sufficiency. Attaching the label of famine to Malawi 
over the years, thus, is deceptive: if Malawi is party to the international neoliberal food 
regime, then their food crises do not arise out of a lack of availability of food as global food 
production outpaces demand. Malawi’s food crises, therefore, can thus be attributed as a 
lack of access to food (and subsequently, reliability thereof as well). 
 Recent global food crises have been premised upon elevated food prices.247 Not 
being able to afford food is an issue of access, not availability. In 2002, Malawi’s staple food 
crop, Maize, shot up in price by over 300%,248 triggering a food crisis as many Malawians 
could not keep pace with the inflated cost of food. The sudden shock was deemed strange 
due to the relative mildness of the shock to local grain production, but produced a 
significantly higher amount of at-risk individuals as well as death and risk-seeking behaviour 
from poor Malawians.  
4.2.2 Access and the Malawian Economy 
The examination of the term famine and its use goes beyond semantic purposes; 
mislabelling food crises and starvations as famines, and thus as an issue brought about by a 
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shock in the food supply, carries the implicit assumption that the cause is largely exogenous 
and unforeseeable – brought on by events such as natural disasters, conflict, or other 
disruptions in food distribution. However, as an issue of access, causes of food crises differ. 
As noted, Malawi’s food crisis of 2002 was deemed abnormal by certain spectators due to 
the relative mildness of the shock to the local food supply. Given the global nature of food 
stocks, this is tantamount to an understatement – during these crises, food was available, 
but not affordable and, thus, inaccessible to the poorest of a country already infamously 
poor. 
 Malawi’s chronic food crisis is characterised by the inability to access food. This 
access to food is conditioned by the neoliberal food regime which normalises the paths to 
food security through trade, not via self-sustainability. Malawi is structurally unable to 
ensure access to food due to economic and political reasons. Therefore, in order to argue 
that foreign aid negatively impacts Malawi’s food security, one needs to demonstrate the 
negative impact of foreign aid on the country’s economic and political reality. 
4.3 Negative Effects of Foreign Aid in Malawi 
4.3.1 Taxes and Government Apathy 
Malawi’s governmental budget is tax-based. Using taxes as a means of raising funds serves 
the dual purposes of relying on a diversified source of income, as well as acting “as a 
measure of government performance, transparency and accountability.”249 In general, 
governments are incentivised to implement economic and service delivery policies which 
will result in a steady (or rising) flow of revenue accrued from tax so as to increase the 
national budget. A slump in tax revenue – and therefore in a government’s budget – should 
be followed by the necessary steps to regain stability. This acts as a feedback loop sensitive 
to “a government’s social and economic policy priorities.”250 Thus, disabling the feedback 
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provided by the “nexus between expenditures and taxation”251 can result in an apathetic 
government, effectively impacting society as: 
“the absence of effective transparency and accountability mechanisms [such as 
taxation]… are the major constraints to effective service delivery, effective 
implementation of poverty reduction programmes and promotion of local 
economic development.”252 
In an econometric study conducted by John Thornton, it was tested whether “foreign aid 
reduces tax revenue”. Thornton concludes the study by stating that he “find[s] emphatic 
support for the hypothesis that aid causes a reduction in tax effort.”253 As Moyo pointed 
out, this can “result in laziness (sic) on the part of African policy makers” as they are not 
incentivised to “pursue tax revenues.”254 Karen Remmer agrees with the sentiment, finding 
that “aid dependence is linked with reduced revenue generation.”255   
Foreign aid accruing to a central government may disable the feedback provided by 
tax collection (depending on the impact of the aid on a government’s income) as the funds 
provided by donors prop up a government’s annual budget. Remmer’s research points out 
that aid is “an important determinant of government size.”256 The higher the percentage of 
aid to the recipient’s national GDP and state budget, the larger a government is prone to 
grow as a state’s bureaucracy swells (itself a sign of patronage). 
The concerns of the neoliberal critics of foreign aid, as emphasised by Thornton’s 
results, is apparent in the case of Malawi, where an average of 40 percent of the national 
budget has been made up by foreign aid over the past decade and a half (2000-2015).257 
Arguably, the dependence on foreign aid in the national budget may undercut tax payers’ 
interests as the feedback delivered to government via tax-collection becomes less 
pronounced.  
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In theory, Malawi’s government does not have the same incentives to make policy 
which will raise revenue accrued via tax collection. Similarly, Malawi’s government is not 
incentivised to maintain service delivery or improve infrastructure, such as roads and 
telecommunications – services and public goods which have the ability to positively affect 
economic development. Ultimately, whether a policy succeeds or fails is irrelevant as 
Malawi’s government will still be paid.  
The World Bank estimates that Malawi spends 6% of its income on sustaining and 
creating infrastructure. For similar nations (low-income, non-fragile African states), the 
figure rises to 10%, making “Malawi’s infrastructure funding gap… US $0.3 billion per year”. 
Not only is Malawi lagging in infrastructure development, but the current generation of 
infrastructure is mismanaged – Water and Electricity, for example, actually costs Malawi an 
additional 1.8% of its GDP due to mismanagement and failed upkeep. In other areas, 
“[d]istribution losses are almost 35 percent, while revenue collection is estimated as low as 
50 percent.”258 
4.3.2 Aid and Corruption 
Perhaps the biggest strain on continued donor presence in Malawi lies with the presence of 
corruption in recipient nations. After Malawi’s Cashgate scandal broke, public pressure on 
aid programs mounted, resulting in the United Kingdom, Norway and the European Union’s 
decision in 2013 to halt “financial aid programs amounting to more than US $150 million a 
year.”259 This particular suspension of foreign aid, however, is not an isolated instance – 
Britain (Malawi’s biggest, and most influential donor) enacted a similar moratorium on its 
aid program in 2011 following the purchase of President Bingu Wa Mutharika’s presidential 
jet worth US $13.26 million of donor funds – Britain, however, attributed the decision to 
Malawi’s “failure in economic management”, which may or may not be seen as a 
euphemism for corrupt practices.260 As of 2015, Britain has not resumed direct, bilateral 
foreign aid to Malawi, but does continue to deliver aid through private channels. 
Unfortunately, even this initiative is under fire as Malawi’s current president, Peter 
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Mutharika, vowed to buy back the presidential jet, once again stoking complaints from 
donor publics.261 
 As noted above in discussing government apathy, foreign aid is “an important 
determinant of government size.”262 In general the higher the amount of aid given, the 
larger a government will grow. Rajeev Goel and Michael Nelson link the size of government 
to the manifestation of corruption: through scrutinising state-level data, the authors find 
that “government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a 
strong positive influence on corruption.”263 This seems to imply a correlation between 
foreign aid and corruption. However, the literature provides a mixed consensus on the 
issue, despite the logical conclusion concerning separate studies on government size, 
corruption and foreign aid. For example, authors José Tavares,264 Keisuke Okada and 
Sovannroeun Samreth265 conclude, using separate methods of analysis, that foreign aid 
actually decreases the incidence of corruption.  
Despite this, the literature does offer caveats pertinent to Malawi’s case – indicating 
that aid may be incentivising rent seeking: Okada and Samreth state that, when it comes to 
decreasing the incidence of corruption “bilateral aid from the world’s leading donor 
countries, including France, the UK, and the US, has no significant effect.”266 Although there 
are multiple sources of foreign aid in Malawi, the biggest sources are bilateral in nature – as 
in the case of Britain, Norway and the EU. Tavares points to Alesina and Dollar’s paper “Who 
Gives Aid to Whom and Why?”,267 stating that since motivation behind donor programs are 
generally driven by interests held by the donor nations, “one cannot infer from [their] 
results that when more aid is observed lower corruption will follow.”268 
In the case of Malawi, a cursory glance at recent history suggests that foreign aid has 
had an effect on instigating corrupt behaviour. Whether this is an inherent effect of foreign 
aid, or whether the corrupt behaviour would be present without aid, one can still attribute 
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foreign aid as having played a role if for no other reason than providing an increased 
incentive for rent seeking practices as more funds are available.  
4.3.3 Donor Conditionality and Policy Effects 
Craig Burnside and David Dollar address the question whether foreign aid has an impact on 
the recipient’s economic growth. Taking their lead from various authors who conclude that 
foreign aid does not have an effect on economic development (operationalised via a 
measure of growth), Burnside and Dollar expand on the number of cases and have retested 
the hypothesis. Their findings point out “that on average aid has had little impact on 
growth” except for “in a good policy environment.”269 In reference to Malawi, a good policy 
environment is, ironically, not present partly due to the presence of foreign aid (as noted in 
discussing aid-induced government apathy); therefore, a potential positive effect induced by 
the introduction of aid on growth in Malawi is not expected. However, Malawi’s 
performance over the past half-decade contradicts these expectations as Malawi 
experienced some of the world’s highest levels of economic expansion, growing at an 
average of 7% between 2009 and 2014.270 The growth, although high, was erratic during this 
period.271  
 Positive economic management and growth in Malawi is an implicit condition 
applied in many bilateral donors’ aid packages to the country, such as the aid given by 
Britain. The mere label given to the aid program (billed as “developmental aid”) reinforces 
this conditionality. The decision by Britain in 2011 to suspend bilateral funding to Malawi 
was, as noted, officially attributed to “the country's repeated failure to address concerns 
over economic management and governance.”272 Between 2009 and 2014 (the years in 
which Malawi experienced high rates of growth) Britain had withdrawn aid on two separate 
occasions – from 2011 to 2012, and again after the breaking of the Cashgate scandal. 
Despite the disruption in aid, growth was unaffected. The question, therefore, becomes: 
how was Malawi achieving growth if what Burnside and Dollar call “a good policy 
environment” was not present? 
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 Dependency on aid may, paradoxically, provide an answer to this question. If a 
government is increasingly apathetic to its role in providing for its people due to aid funding 
a government’s budget, development and upkeep of the economy is relegated in favour of 
maintaining aid flows. In Malawi’s case, growth has been stipulated by donors as a means of 
sustaining or increasing aid flows since the largest donors (such as Britain) measure 
development via economic expansion. As pointed out in the previous chapter, “the 
performance of the tobacco sector is [the] key to short-term growth.”273 Recognising this, 
sectors of Malawi’s government (following the publishing of the Growth and Development 
Strategy in 2005-2006) implemented the much-lauded Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), 
whereby government subsidises fertiliser for millions, focussing on the country’s poorer 
small-scale farmers.274 As a result, agricultural production has been increased. 
 In light of Malawi’s poor state capacity, partly incurred by foreign aid’s effect on 
inducing “a lack of motivation and interest to develop” institutions and infrastructure, the 
growth accrued from agriculture is not sustainable in the long-term.275 The poor state 
capacity and infrastructural base sees that:  
“Malawi’s product space will remain too underdeveloped to ensure, by itself, that 
the 2003-13 growth acceleration regime is translated into a growth maintenance 
regime in the next ten years.”276 
Furthermore, as Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne point out, “it is unlikely that using public funds to 
subsidize roughly 90% of the fertilizer cost for farmers is an effective strategy to reduce 
poverty.”277 Olivier de Schutter, the UN Special Rapporteur to Malawi on the right to food, 
in 2013 concurred with the idea that the policy of subsidising fertiliser was ill-conceived 
when he “asked the government to reassess its agriculture priorities.”278 De Schutter states 
that the FISP “is not working as planned” and that it is “draining a lot of funds that could be 
used to develop other agricultural programs.”279 The critique that the subsidy program is 
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not working as planned is partly associated with the short-term focus by government, 
perhaps attempting to placate or lure donors: although subsidised fertilisers have been 
boosting output, increasing production and spurring economic growth, heavy fertiliser 
usage is short-sighted. A subsidy program aimed to encourage fertiliser use only solves soil 
infertility in the short-term; extended fertiliser use does not address the underlying issue of 
improved soil fertility over the long term and may, in fact, damage long-term soil fertility.   
In summation, as growth becomes a goal to sate donor-imposed “developmental” 
conditions, Malawi’s government is incentivised to achieve short-term growth through 
agriculturally intensive subsidy programs whereas the conditions needed for long-term 
growth, such as developing infrastructure and the state’s capacity, remain neglected. 
4.3.4 Economic Knock-on  
The argument presented that foreign aid promotes unsustainable and short-sighted 
economic policies should be viewed in light of the country’s economic performance in areas 
other than growth. 
In 2009, early in the period of Malawi’s boom in economic growth, the country was 
running a trade deficit of US $241 million, comprising 5,6% of national GDP. At the start of 
2014, after over four years of experiencing an average 7% growth,280 Malawi’s trade deficit 
increased to US $769,81 million – comprising 20,77% of Malawi’s GDP. Malawi’s trade 
deficit during the time of economic boom, fuelled by aid-funded short-term agricultural 
growth, nearly quadrupled the country’s trade deficit (as a measure of its GDP).281 Despite 
Malawi’s GDP experiencing an average growth of 7%, there was also an increase in imports 
while exports failed to keep pace, leading to the ballooning of the trade deficit.282 
 A trade deficit, it should be stated, is not necessarily considered as a disadvantage in 
the short-term. A trade deficit may just be an indication of rapid growth – during which 
imports are expected to surge as people spend more. Governments are able to manage 
trade-deficits with good fiscal policy. However, long-term deficits do cause investor 
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confidence to plummet and can also negatively affect a currency’s exchange rate as 
currency flows out of a country. Repeated trade deficits may also impact a nation’s foreign 
reserves negatively, forcing governments to borrow money in order to finance budgetary 
needs. Malawi already relies on foreign aid to prop up its national budget, and therefore is 
left facing options focussed on foreign investment and quantitative easing (whereby it mints 
new currency) in order to finance any deficit. Minting new currency depreciates the value of 
the currency.  
 In 2011-2012, Malawi faced the nadir of the cyclical bust-boom induced by this 
macro-economic cocktail of high inflation, a trade deficit, and a volatile exchange rate. The 
effect of the “steadily rising import bill, fuelled in part by fertilizer imports”283 used in 
subsidising smallholder farms through the FISP program, was compounded by drops in the 
price of burley tobacco leaves (the country’s primary export)284 and oil price volatility.285 
President Joyce Banda eventually devalued Malawi’s Kwacha, the national currency, by a 
further 50% on recommendation by IGOs and INGOs.286 
 In Malawi’s case, investor confidence is already low with the withdrawal of aid 
support by foreign governments in response to the Cashgate scandal.287 Additionally, 
President Mutharika recently stated that, despite economic growth (driven by the 
agricultural sector) the country’s foreign exchange reserves “still remain lower than 
adequate”288 and that there is a need to reduce “the structural trade deficit.”289 Inflation 
also remains high – in 2012, inflation hit 21,3% and peaked a year later at 27,3%; at the time 
of writing, inflation rates in Malawi remain high at 18,8%.290 The Kwacha has been devalued 
overall from its position in 2011,291 failing to bounce back to pre-2011 levels.292 The 
devalued Kwacha can be attributed to the country’s high rate of inflation, its structural trade 
deficit, and volatile or low investor confidence. 
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4.4 Aid and Food Access in Malawi 
The role foreign aid potentially plays in perpetuating food insecurity in Malawi is premised 
upon the ideas highlighted above in explaining the effects of aid’s disproportionate 
presence in making up Malawi’s governmental revenue. Malawi’s government has become 
dependent on foreign aid funding its continued and enlarged bureaucratic operations. The 
dependence by those in power results in three related outcomes affecting the country’s 
economic access to food: perpetuating an agrarian economy, stoking inflation and currency 
depreciation, and maintaining compliance to the dominant neoliberal food regime. All three 
issues are dependent on the Malawian government’s attempts at appeasing donors via the 
conditionality of development – development which is operationalised as economic growth. 
The government achieves this goal by favouring unsustainable, short term growth in the 
agricultural sector while neglecting infrastructure and state capacity. 
4.4.1 The Effect of Unstable Growth – Currency Worth 
The effects of unstable and unsustainable growth fuelled by short-term initiatives negatively 
affect Malawi’s food security at the national, household, and individual levels. A devalued 
currency, coupled with high inflation, does not bode well for the poorest of Malawians. On 
one hand, high growth rates allow the poorest of Malawi to purchase more, including 
foodstuffs; on the other hand, if growth is too rapid (when it becomes unsustainable or 
exceeds long-term averages), the economy faces inflation which affects the nation’s 
currency. Although growth levels have been high, growth was erratic293 – resulting in 
inflation. In Malawi, where inflation rates are high and the currency remains weak, the high 
rate of growth does not necessarily result in poverty reduction as items become more 
expensive and the worth of people’s savings decline.  
Nationally, as already covered, Malawi’s imports far outpace the state’s exports. 
Furthermore, as Malawi’s currency weakens, imports become more expensive. Over the 
past decade and a half, Malawi has traditionally imported “food, petroleum products, semi-
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manufactures, consumer goods, [and] transportation equipment.”294 Within the prevailing 
global food regime, trade is deemed as the route to food security; however, as the Kwacha 
remains unstable, trade-induced food security remains uncertain. The price of food imports, 
in particular, is subject not only to forces present at the national level, but is sensitive to 
forces from the international arena as well – such as the effect of oil on international 
trade.295 For example, “the Malawian economy was subjected to… unprecedented global oil 
and food price shocks during 2008-2010” which negatively affected the Kwacha’s value, 
compounding the drain on Malawi’s foreign reserves.296  
 Malawi, as of writing, does not produce any petroleum products,297 therefore 
putting the country’s petroleum needs squarely dependent on imports. Malawi’s landlocked 
status already makes their oil imports expensive due to the externalities involved in 
transporting the commodity from ports, through neighbouring countries, via poorly 
maintained transport infrastructure. A fluctuating exchange rate (whether induced by 
external shocks or internal policies) makes oil expensive – with an increase in oil, comes an 
increase in costs in other areas of Malawi’s economy, in turn negatively affecting Malawi’s 
citizens both commercially and privately. Lastly, an increase in the oil price will increase the 
price of food imports as well. 
At the level of the household, the pressures on Malawi’s ability to afford the needed 
imported food also affect consumers. Oil price increases affected costs worldwide, pushing 
food prices up around the globe; the North African/Arab Spring was partly attributed to the 
price increase in basic foodstuffs, sparking protests and riots across Tunisia.298 International 
corn prices doubled during the time, while in Malawi corn prices shot up 174% between 
2011 and 2012.299 The devaluation of Malawi’s Kwacha affects not only government’s ability 
to afford imports, but also the ability of consumers to afford basic foodstuffs. For example: 
after high levels of growth, people can buy more bread; but as inflation takes root, and the 
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Kwacha loses value, bread becomes more expensive, once again limiting access to food for 
many Malawians. 
4.4.2 Asymmetry and Imbalance 
Although inflation and currency depreciation play roles in perpetuating food insecurity in 
Malawi, the policy of stoking short-term growth via multi-million dollar farm subsidies also 
plays a deeper structural role as it promotes the preservation of an agricultural-based 
economy. In a country where an estimated 54% of people live below the poverty line, the 
agricultural sector absorbs 90% of Malawi’s workforce.300 This force comprises 
approximately a third of Malawi’s population – carrying the implication that, statistically, 
every person in the workforce supports three people (including themselves).301 Among the 
poor, largely situated in rural areas, this dependency is more severe. 
An agrarian-based economy, upon which millions of Malawians depend, has long-
term negative effects. For explanatory purposes, consider tobacco’s role in Malawi. It is 
referred to by many Malawians as “green gold”302 due to the disproportionately large role it 
plays in providing work and foreign exchange for the country – as of 2015, the sale of burley 
tobacco leaf comprises 53% of the nation’s foreign exchange (among commodities 
exported).303 However, agrarian production is generally a low-income endeavour due to the 
fungibility304 of the product (as is the case with agricultural commodities in general). One 
farmer’s tobacco crop is nearly indistinguishable from another farmer’s tobacco crop.  
Due to the agrarian nature of tobacco, the industry is perhaps more vulnerable to 
external shocks such as the impact of flooding, droughts, fires, and other natural disasters. 
For example, as Malawi’s maize crops were negatively affected by flooding over the years, 
Malawi’s tobacco production suffered similar setbacks.305 As was shown above, even non-
agrarian industries may affect the volatility of tobacco supply (such as the effect which oil 
has on the transportation of the crop, the machination of the process, the increased cost of 
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labour transport, and so forth). Even though these types of externalities affect all economic 
activity, the impact on low-cost products such as agriculture commodities are much higher.  
With external shocks such as these, many farmworkers are economically impacted, affecting 
their ability to access food.  
In 2008, for example, tobacco prices started strong on a “very high note with prices 
reaching the phenomenal price of 11 dollars per kg” on the first day of the trading 
season.306 However, by the second day, prices stabilised at a rate ranging “between 2.30 
dollars and 60 cents for the same quality crop.”307 This volatility in the price of tobacco leaf 
continues, generally remaining low. According to AHL Tobacco Malawi, prices of tobacco at 
the time of writing averaged US $1.60 per kilo.308 Over the past, the cost of tobacco has 
continued to fluctuate wildly.309 Between 2004 and 2009, tobacco prices increased by 50%, 
however decreased the following year by 22%, decreasing again the next year by 37%.310 
More crucially, however, is agriculture’s income-earning potential in relation to 
other sectors. Once again, consider tobacco: on average, a pack of 20 cigarettes contains 
12.5 grams of tobacco.311 Therefore, for every one kilogram of tobacco sold, an average of 
80 packs of cigarettes (containing 20 cigarettes each) can be manufactured. Cigarettes are 
imported to Malawi, and a pack of cigarettes in Malawi, comprising the 12.5 grams of 
tobacco, currently costs US $2.8 (as of writing).312 Each pack of cigarettes, therefore, 
contains the equivalent US $0.02 worth of Malawian tobacco. In order to afford one pack of 
cigarettes, a tobacco farmer must sell 1.75 kgs of tobacco. In other terms, in order to afford 
a product containing 12.5 grams of tobacco, a Malawian would need to sell an additional 
1.7375 kg of the leaf. 
Although the scenario above only mentions tobacco, the same dynamic is present in most (if 
not all) agricultural products and is generally true for commodities used in manufacturing. 
As stated, the impact of maintaining an economy dependent on agriculture, like Malawi, is 
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that the amount of revenue generated by agriculture is low. In terms of the ability to 
generate revenue, agriculture falls at the bottom of the list – above it lie industries 
categorised by: light, heavy, and mass manufacturing, mass marketing, computerisation, 
and knowledge (in order). Other than food and petroleum products (which counts as 
manufactured goods due to the process of refinement), Malawi’s next biggest imports are 
“semi-manufactures, consumer goods, [and] transportation equipment.” 313 The 
issue of losing reserves to imported goods is apparent to certain members of 
government: President Peter Mutharika, for example, has called for measures 
such as “increased investing in cigarette manufacturing.” 314  
As a consequence of this structural imbalance in revenue generation, 
Malawi will increasingly lose foreign exchange as the products they produce and 
export cost significantly less than the products imported in return. Not only 
does this drain the country’s foreign reserves, but it also entrenches farm 
workers’ low purchasing power, influencing the food security of households by 
limiting economic access to food available on (and influenced by) the 
international market. 
4.4.3 Compliance to the Neoliberal Food Regime 
Malawi is dependent on foreign aid. Without it, the national government loses 
approximately 40% of its annual budget. As such, Malawi is not at liberty to oppose donor 
nations. The dependence on aid is evident by Malawi’s government’s response every time a 
foreign government withdraw financial aid from Malawi following scandals, 
mismanagement of funds, or failure to meet the conditions stipulated for aid. In response, 
the national government seeks to restore foreign aid flows as soon as possible, pledging “to 
restore relations with donors.”315 
 The dominant norms surrounding ideas of development, for example, mirror the 
standards held by the dominant food regime: namely that unfettered trade is the route to 
ensuring growth, and thus development. Malawi, as a de-facto client of donors benefitting 
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from this framework, is obliged to adhere to the same international framework lest losing 
out on foreign aid. 
4.5 Summary 
In order to argue that foreign aid has an effect on perpetuating food insecurity in Malawi, 
the critique of foreign aid must be understood in context of the norms dictating food 
security trends. Internationally, the dominant food regime compels nations to achieve food 
security not through self-sustainability, but via international trade. The global supply of 
food, therefore, is the source of food security and insecurity – not the production of food 
locally (as advocated by the challenging food sovereignty movement). According to various 
INGOs and IGOs, the international food supply outpaces international demand, yet Malawi’s 
various food crises are labelled as famines.  
The label of famine indicates a supply issue – an event where levels of food 
production cannot meet demand. Malawi neither attempts food self-sufficiency (solely 
attempting to grow the needed food locally), nor is a pariah state cut off from trade: 
therefore, categorising Malawi’s food crises as famines, and therefore as problems caused 
by an insufficient supply of food, is incongruent with the dominant international food 
regime which it is party to. If food security is ideally achieved via international trade, and the 
supply of food internationally outpaces demand, then a food crisis cannot be labelled as the 
result of inadequate supply. The issue, therefore, is the access to the international food 
supply by communities where access is predicated upon trade, as dictated by the 
international neoliberal food regime.  
Thus, linking food security and foreign aid in Malawi requires one to show the effect 
of foreign aid on a state’s ability to access food; foreign aid’s economic impact, therefore, is 
crucial. A critique of foreign aid, like much else concerning political issues, is ideologically 
inclined. A useful ideological framework for critique of aid is the left-right continuum used in 
other fields. On the right of the political spectrum, the critique of aid focuses around the 
perversion of government intervention of an essentially self-regulating economic activity as 
well as the negative effect had upon government as a result of this intervention. On the left, 
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the critique of aid is centred upon the efficacy of aid and the social effect upon the 
recipient. 
According to the critique of foreign aid, bilateral financial support to Malawi may 
induce government apathy. As a government’s revenue increasingly derives from foreign 
aid, other sources of income are relegated to secondary concerns. In Malawi, the national 
government is traditionally funded by taxation. However, as foreign aid composes an 
increasingly large portion of the government’s operational resources (40% of national 
government), maintaining a flow of tax-based income is relegated to concerns of 
maintaining funding from foreign donors. This is not to say that taxation of citizens is 
overlooked, but that it is instead a second-thought to issues of foreign aid. As such, not only 
is the feedback between a government’s economic and social governance fragmented (since 
tax flows provide feedback on policy successes and failures), but spending is shifted away 
from infrastructure, services, and welfare, to concerns of placating the donor nations’ aid 
conditionality.  
As Malawi’s government income largely derives from foreign funding, its 
bureaucracy swells and opportunities for rent seeking and political patronage increases. 
Malawi’s Cashgate scandal is indicative of this, if for no other reason than foreign aid 
offering increased opportunity for corruption. Flows of foreign aid become increasingly 
important as government becomes dependent on the revenue provided by foreign donors. 
These donors attach conditions to the continued presence of aid in Malawi, most notably 
development. The norms dictating development are the same which dictate the 
international food regime: subsequently, one indicator of development is economic growth.  
Dependent on aid for government funding, Malawi’s national government targets 
development to sate the donors’ conditions, resulting in economic growth taking centre 
stage in policy considerations. In order to sate donors, however, Malawi’s national 
government invoke unsustainable policies of growth by subsidising fertiliser for poor 
farmers, thus increasing output and spurring economic expansion. Unfortunately, this 
growth is short-sighted and unsustainable as fertiliser programs do not address the 
underlying problem of long-term soil fertility. Furthermore, the policies spurring short term 
growth is unstable, causing negative economic knock-ons, such as inflation and a volatile 
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currency. Inflation and currency volatility effectively cause poor Malawians purchasing 
power to decline or remain the same. Economic access to food, therefore, remains 
precarious for many despite economic expansion. 
Additionally, perpetuating an agrarian based economy ensures that most Malawians 
will continue to earn a low income due to agriculture’s low earning potential. This not only 
limits households’ access to food, but perpetuates the country’s structural trade deficit as 
imports continue to outpace exports. In turn, the trade deficit may fuel economic instability 
and negatively impact the ability of households to access food. Finally, the dependence on 
aid virtually ensures that Malawi remains trapped within a neoliberal framework which does 
not favour those most at risk.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion 
 
The presence of large flows of foreign aid to Malawi is detrimental to the country’s food 
security. This argument is largely dependent on the theoretical understandings of the two 
main elements – foreign aid and food security – as well as the interaction of these concepts 
within the context of international and historical political forces. 
Foreign aid is, firstly, understood as consisting of all types of resources which are 
transferred from one international actor to another. Secondly, foreign aid differs from trade 
as it is not explicitly accompanied by a transaction, whether fiscal or otherwise. The purpose 
of foreign aid is conditioned by an ideological perspective: whereas Liberal Internationalists 
espouse an apolitical functionalist view of foreign aid, proponents of Marxism and Realism 
view foreign aid as being inherently political. This paper, in agreement with the findings of 
Alesina and Dollar, agrees with the idea that foreign aid is inherently political as donors have 
the power to decide “who gets what, when and how” (to quote Harold Lasswell). This 
affords donors political power over recipients. The terminology surrounding foreign aid is 
similarly coloured by whichever ideological lens it is viewed through. 
 Food security falls under the human security framework. Over many decades, the 
concept has evolved and is now considered to exist: 
“when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to 
sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food 
preferences for an active and healthy life.” 
This evolution of the concept of food security is notable as it embodies the recognition for 
the need for a broadened understanding of the concept to encompass issues of access to 
food in addition to issues of supply. Access largely denotes the economic, social, and political 
ability to obtain food. In addition to a broadened understanding of the concept, the 
evolution of the term has widened the range of actors who may be considered food 
insecure. Just as the concept’s prior scope had limited it to concerns of supply, previous 
iterations of the concept similarly considered the state and the international levels as the 
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main units under consideration when discerning food insecurity. The evolved understanding, 
however, has come to highlight issues of availability, access, reliability, and food use at the 
levels of the household and the individual in addition to the national and international 
spheres. This expansion on the understanding of which actors are affected by food insecurity 
operates in a nested manner – that is to say, food insecurity at the level of the international 
system will similarly present itself at the sub-levels of the national, household, and individual 
as well. Any level has the potential to affect the food security of the various levels below it. 
 As the concept has evolved, so has the understanding of food crises. Famines, 
possibly the most notable and publically recognisable of the types of food crises, have grown 
to represent an instance whereby a long-term food crisis is characterised by a lack in a 
supply (or availability) of food. A logical step, then, would be to recognise that a long-term 
food crisis which is not caused by the unavailability of food cannot be labelled as a famine. 
Amartya Sen has proposed the use of the term “starvation” to denote a long-term food crisis 
characterised by a lack in access.316 
 Tackling food insecurity over the century has followed a path dictated by the history 
of international economic interaction as well as the international community’s experience 
with fighting hunger during the post-war years. With the advent of a neoliberal world order, 
a neoliberal path to food security has grown in popularity and is treated as gospel among 
many states, IGOs, and INGOs. Trade and economic growth has been regarded as the escape 
route leading out of a state of food insecurity. This emphasis on trade and economic growth 
also indicates an acceptance of the issue of access to food as a crucial element in combatting 
malnourishment. Of course, this would not have become dogma had the global supply - or 
availability - of food been inadequate, since no amount of economic growth can grant one 
food security if there simply is not any food to gain access to. This comes in light of a global 
surplus in food production (as estimated by INGOs and IGOs). This dogma of a trade-based 
solution to food insecurity, known as the neoliberal or corporate food regime, is challenged 
by the idea of food sovereignty – a food regime which proposes that states be empowered 
to be self-sustainable in providing food for itself in order not to fall victim to the volatility of 
international economic interactions which may dictate an actor’s ability to access global 
food supplies. 
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 In the recent past, the international trend in food insecurity has been observed to be 
one characterised by a lack in access – what Thurow calls a “damning indictment of the 
world’s food-distribution system.”317 Although global food production theoretically outpaces 
demand, it is not realised in practice. Food shortages in areas around the world as diverse 
and spatially removed from one another such as Tunisia, Pakistan, Mozambique, China, 
India, and Chile318 (among others)  have led to rioting, political upheaval, malnourishment, 
and death. Africa and many parts of Asia remain most liable to be negatively affected by this 
failure of the international distribution system, marking these regions as being perennially at 
risk of not being able to access food (and thus food insecure). 
 Malawi is one such nation. Since the country’s independence from Britain, it has 
combatted numerous cases of widespread hunger. With the advent of the 21st century, 
however, the country’s food problems have become perpetual. Since 2001, Malawians have 
been increasingly at risk of being undernourished. Between 2001 and 2015, the state 
experienced widespread flooding on several occasions, destroying large swathes of the 
state’s annual agricultural yield. Many have pointed to these events as the reason why the 
state is unable to stave off hunger, putting Malawi’s problems squarely in the hands of 
natural phenomena beyond human control. The problem, however, is that the dynamic 
between Malawi’s experience with flooding and its food problem has been misconstrued – 
reporting of the incident has largely and implicitly labelled Malawi’s food problems as a 
famine by attributing the destruction of the maize crop as a the cause of its hunger problem.  
 The idea that Malawi’s experience with flooding has caused an insufficient level of 
food, and therefore hunger, ignores two crucial aspects of food insecurity: (1) that global 
food production outpaces demand, and (2) that the dominant food regime espouses trade as 
the route to food security. With that in mind, Malawi should be able to trade its way to food 
security regardless of flooding, drought, or any other factors which inhibit the domestic 
supply of food. Malawi’s hunger problem is not one of availability, it is one of access. 
Malawians are food insecure as they are unable to afford food – not because none is 
available. 
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 Foreign aid’s role in perpetuating the food insecurity in Malawi, therefore, rests on 
its capacity to promote the inability to afford food at the national, household, and individual 
levels. Bilateral foreign aid to Malawi makes up approximately 40% of the national 
government’s budget. Such a large percentage of dependence on external fiscal support 
has, it is argued, led to several negative consequences for the country’s economic position. 
Not only does a country’s governmental bureaucracy swell with the presence of large 
amounts of foreign aid, but such bloating of government – coupled with an increased 
budget - may promote the likelihood of rent-seeking behaviour. 
A government dependent on foreign funding for a large percentage of its revenue is 
increasingly incentivised to ensure that the flow of external fiscal support remains stable. In 
order to achieve this outcome, recipients aim to sate any conditions set by donors. As such, 
the fate of a government’s policies lies in the hands of the donor. Recipient governments 
may become largely apathetic towards the expectations held by its citizens in lieu of those 
expectations held by donating entities. This may translate into a perversion of policy making 
whereby the national electorate is supplanted with a foreign constituency which bankrolls 
the continued operation of government activity.  
For Malawi, foreign aid has assisted in funding agricultural subsidy programs, 
providing fertiliser to hundreds of thousands of the country’s poorest smallholder farmers. 
As a result, the state has experienced high levels of economic growth as farmers are able to 
produce more food, thanks to the improvement of soil fertility. If Malawi was not subject to 
the international corporate food regime, the increase in agricultural output would be a 
welcome boon. However, as already noted, the increased production of food locally should 
have little impact in a world which already produces more than enough food to meet global 
demands. Food grown locally is not necessarily consumed by those who have grown it, but 
is instead sold in order to earn a basic income. 
In a cruelly ironic scenario, the income earned by selling agricultural products, 
however, remains wholly inadequate as a means of ensuring food security. International 
food prices remain volatile due to circumstances beyond Malawi’s control – as is evident 
when considering the impact which the oil price, various natural disasters, and other 
elements have upon speculation surrounding international food supplies. Under a regime 
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which dictates trade as a path to overcoming food insecurity, Malawi remains locked in a 
status quo which sees to its perennial inability to access food via the market. Although many 
farmers grow foodstuffs, it is pertinent to note that the overwhelming majority of all 
agricultural output in Malawi is not edible. Tobacco alone makes up roughly 50% of the 
state’s agricultural yield, with other cash crops such as sugar, cotton, and tea making up a 
larger percentage of the state’s agricultural output than maize and other staple foods. Even 
if the state were to follow tenets of food sovereignty, a sea change in agriculture would be 
needed; tobacco, sugar, tea, and cotton cannot sustain life. 
Malawi has a largely rural population – an unsurprising fact given that people tend to 
live where work is available; the agricultural sector in Malawi is the biggest employer, with 
90% of all those employed working within the sector. Additionally, it should be noted that 
for every Malawian who is employed, two more are unemployed. This does not account for 
those not actively looking for work – such as the elderly and the young. In effect, more than 
66% (or two thirds) of the population’s food security rests upon the earning potential of the 
33% of the labour pool who are employed. Agriculture, unfortunately, is a low-income 
sector as it falls on the low-end of the value chain. For example, a farmer growing tobacco 
must sell 1,75 kgs of tobacco in order to afford a pack of cigarettes containing a mere 12.5 
grams of the leaf (140 times less). This trend holds for any product which needs post-harvest 
processing. 
In light of the above, it should be no surprise that Malawi’s largest exports are 
agricultural products. On the other side of Malawi’s current accounts, however, it is 
important to note that the nation is a net importer of goods. Food is one of the goods which 
are imported – both as a processed and unprocessed product. Regardless of the level of 
post-harvest production, other externalities (such as transportation and logistical costs) 
raise the price of food. Processed goods (such as electronics) are even more expensive due 
to this dynamic. The relative earning potential of Malawians working in the agricultural 
sector is outweighed by people working in the secondary and tertiary sectors.  
Foreign aid to Malawi only exacerbates this structural problem. Donors demand 
good economic management and development from recipient nations: a variable largely 
operationalised in terms of economic growth. In order to keep up flows of foreign aid, 
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therefore, Malawi’s government has targeted growth. The substantial period of growth 
experienced by Malawi was driven by increased output per person in the agricultural sector, 
thanks in part to the subsidised fertiliser program initiated by the Malawian government. 
This growth, although appeasing conditions set by donors, has been unstable and 
unsustainable. The growth has been erratic: between 2009 and 2013, growth rates ranged 
from 1.9% to 9.5%.  
The perpetuation and promotion of Malawi’s agricultural economy is a consequence 
of government policy and comes at the expense of a much needed long term developmental 
trajectory which is able to diversify the country’s economic makeup. Infrastructure, for 
example, is drastically underfunded and poorly run, ultimately negatively impacting 
investment flows into the country. Investment into the booming agricultural sector will 
continue to outpace investment in secondary and tertiary sector initiatives.  
Rapid economic growth, though lauded, does also merit a caveat: a rapidly growing 
country may overheat, eroding any gains in purchasing power achieved by growth in the 
first place. In other words, any increase in wealth may be counteracted by inflation, thus 
maintaining the status quo. This problem is compounded by the above mentioned trade 
imbalance (a trade deficit of US $800 million in 2012): the mere imbalance in value of traded 
goods has caused a shortage in the state’s foreign exchange reserves and has drastically 
depreciated the country’s currency. Between July of 2010 and January of 2015, the Kwacha 
fell in worth from US $0.0070 to US $0.0020. This continues a gradual downward trend in 
the currency’s worth over the decade. As a result, products imported are more expensive 
and the gains from growth have been eroded by inflation.  
The perpetuation of Malawi’s economic reality firmly reinforces Malawi’s position as 
a state on the periphery of the global economy. A world systems theory approach suggests 
that core states create and recreate the forces which benefit themselves at the expense of 
the periphery and semi-periphery. With foreign aid’s proposed role in promoting food 
insecurity via economic stagnation, the exploitative relationship signifies the entrapment of 
Malawi in the vicious cycle present in the global south. 
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With foodstuffs among the country’s biggest imports, the prognosis for the country’s 
food security remains precariously poised. Food will remain expensive relative to the 
purchasing power of the majority of the population who work low income jobs. The gains in 
purchasing power via high levels of growth will be eroded with the accompanying inflation 
and a weakened Kwacha. Foreign aid’s role in perpetuating malnourishment rests upon its 
ability to perpetuate the status quo of the agricultural economy. In aiming to appease 
donors with high growth, governmental policy has focussed on short-term agrarian yields in 
lieu of long term development: retarding economic diversification and maintaining the 
state’s agrarian identity.  
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Appendix 
                                     
Figure 2.1 – the components of food security. If any one of these components is missing, an 
actor cannot be said to be food secure 
  
Figure 2.2 – diagram illustrating the nested nature of food security at the four different 
levels as they relate to availability and access 
 
Reliability Availability 
Food Use Access 
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national 
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individual 
Availability 
Availability & Access 
Page | 86  
 
Year GDP Growth Annual (%) GDP (current US$) 
2000 1,6 1,743,506,286.6 
2001 -5 1,716,502,069.3 
2002 1,7 2,665,158,942.9 
2003 5,5 2,424,656,666.1 
2004 4,9 2,625,127,097.7 
2005 2,8 2,754,995,876.6 
2006 2,1 3,116,789,657.9 
2007 9,5 3,647,817,218.6 
2008 8,3 4,276,769,712.3 
2009 9 5,030,639,934.4 
2010 6,5 5,398,616,984.6 
2011 4,3 5,627,898,036.6 
2012 1,9 4,240,492,848.8 
2013 5 3,705,386,789.6 
Figure 4.1 - Malawi’s growth rate per year, ranging from 2000 to 2013 
 
Figure 4.2 - The change in Malawi’s imports and exports between 2008 and 2013, as a 
percentage of its GDP at the time 
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Figure 4.3 - Malawi’s Trade Deficit between 2008-2012, measured in current US$ value 
 
Figure 4.4 - The Kwacha’s exchange rate change between August, 2010 and May, 2015 
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Year Range Change 
1991-1995 -25% 
1995-1997 +33% 
1997-2004 -20% 
2004-2009 +50% 
2009-2010 -22% 
2010-2011 -37% 
Figure 4.5 - The change in tobacco prices, as a percentage, between 1991 and 2011 
(Masanjala, 2011) 
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